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2INTRODUCTION 
Trading publicly listed securities on the open market is markedly different from 
traditional face-to-face securities transactions.1 In turn, the modern-day fraud-on-the-market 
securities class action bears little factual resemblance to its common-law predecessors, deceit and 
misrepresentation, which provided conventional contract-based remedies for fraud in face-to-face 
dealings.2 And yet, even though securities laws have detailed pleading standards and nuanced 
requirements for “loss causation,” no coherent doctrinal statement exists for calculating open-
market damages in Rule 10b-5 securities fraud class actions.3 Instead, courts endeavored to 
fashion common-law deceit and misrepresentation remedies to fit open-market fraud.4 The result 
is a relatively ineffective system with a hallmark feature: unpredictable damage awards.  This 
poses a significant fraud deterrence problem from both a practical and a theoretical standpoint.        
 
* Assistant Professor, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University; B.A., Vanderbilt University; J.D., 
Florida State University.  I am indebted to Greg Mitchell, of the University of Virginia School of Law for his 
mentoring, time, and insights on an earlier version of this article; to Joan Heminway of the University of Tennessee 
College of Law for her detailed securities knowledge and her extensive comments on an earlier version of this 
article; as well as to Brannon Denning, Susan Housen, and Peggy Torrey for their invaluable comments and 
recommendations on previous drafts.  Special thanks to Thomas Burch for his continuous feedback and discussion 
throughout the writing process.  If errors exist they are solely my own. 
1 The key feature of face-to-face transactions for our purposes is that the securities purchaser buys the 
securities directly from the corporation or a corporate agent and are thus in privity with the corporation or corporate 
agent.  Consequently, these transactions differ markedly from open-market transactions where investors trade 
securities with one another through the publicly traded securities market.  See generally Steven A. Fishman, Duty to 
Disclose under Rule 10b-5 in Face-to-Face Transactions, 12 J. CORP. L. 251, 256-57 (1987). 
2 See Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 
1488 (1996) (“Securities class action litigation today has little in common with suits over the common law torts of 
fraud and misrepresentation from which the compensatory remedy was derived.”) 
3 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
611, 611 (1985). This Article’s scope is limited to Rule 10b-5 actions involving secondary market transactions.  
Numerous securities class actions include claims under sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Securities Exchange Act and 
while the damages measure under section 11 is similar to Rule 10b-5 cases, this Article focuses on Rule 10b-5.  
Unlike section 11 or Rule 10b-5 cases, to plead a case under section 12, plaintiffs do not have to demonstrate that 
the misrepresentation or omission caused them economic harm.  In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1029 (9th Cir. 
2005); Casella v. Webb, 883 F.2d 805, 808-09 (9th Cir. 1989); Rousseff v. E.F. Hutton Co., 867 F.2d 1281, 1282 
(11th Cir. 1989).  
4 Because a corporation acts only through its agents, the corporation is often required to compensate 
investors for its agents’ acts.  The agents themselves may not even be named in the class action and if they are, their 
portion of the settlement payment will likely come from directors’ and officers’ liability insurance.  Lisa M. Fairfax, 
Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. 
REV. 393, 412-13 (2005); Alexander, supra note 2, at 1498; Jennifer A. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious 
Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 699 (1992).  John 
Coffee, Jr. argues that to achieve optimal deterrence, agents should bear more of the costs of wrongdoing.  John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation 19 (March 
2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=893833.  But see 
Sanjai Bhagat et al., Managerial Indemnification and Liability Insurance: The Effect on Shareholder Wealth, 54J. 
RISK & INS. 721, 726 (1987).  Unless the Department of Justice prosecutes the agents for criminal actions, half or 
more of their settlement payment will likely come from these insurance policies, which the corporation usually pays 
for. See Alexander, supra note 2, at 1498.   
3Though precise damage calculations generally come at the end of litigation, the legal 
standard for measuring loss, and thus for calculating damages to remedy that loss, is important at 
the suit’s outset to determine whether plaintiffs experienced a compensable loss for purposes of 
pleading a viable securities fraud action.5 In 2005, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to 
clarify what constituted a loss in the open market, which could have facilitated earlier dismissal 
of cases without compensable losses.  Instead, dicta in Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo6 further 
confused the damage issue by (1) perpetuating the idea that courts can tailor damages from 
common-law deceit and misrepresentation actions to remedy open-market fraud despite the 
factual disparities between the two and (2) opening the door to a new form of hypothetical losses 
where the stock price increases after an opportune disclosure of fraud.7 Although Dura 
diminished plaintiffs’ ability to sue based on alleged purchase price inflation, its dicta, which 
indicated that plaintiffs might be able to recover when their share prices did not increase as much 
as they otherwise would have after the discovery of fraud, muddied the water with regard to what 
constituted loss. 
 
The Supreme Court’s insinuation that a new form of hypothetical losses might be 
recoverable destabilizes the general notion that plaintiffs are entitled to compensation only for 
their out-of-pocket losses.  Usually, when a corporation discloses a previous unfavorable 
misrepresentation or omission, its stock price drops.  This decline indicates that the investing 
public considered the information relevant.  In Dura, the court implied that an investor might 
recover damages when a stock’s price does not increase as much as it would have absent the 
fraud.8 In other words, if a corporation bundles adverse and favorable information that causes its 
stock price to increase, an investor without any net loss might be able to sue.  This suggests that 
 
5 Although a plaintiff must purchase or sell a security to have standing, she must also have experienced a 
loss that results in an injury.  Barr v. Matria Healthcare, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 2004); see 
generally Miller v. Asenio & Co., Inc., 364 F.3d 223, 230 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate the 
fact of proximately caused damage to establish 10b-5 liability precludes wholly speculative claims and claims by 
plaintiffs who ultimately profit from, or experience no economic pinch as a result of, the challenged transaction.”); 
Wolf v. Frank, 477 F.2d 467, 478 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that plaintiffs have standing only when they can show an 
injury of the type Rule 10b-5 is intended to prevent). 
6 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005).  Several commentators have discussed the impact of Dura in other respects.  
See Larry E. Ribstein, Fraud on a Noisy Market, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 137, 153 (2006); John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Loss Causation After Dura: Something for Everyone, N.Y.L.J. 5 (May 19, 2005); John C. Coffee, Jr., Causation By 
Presumption? Why the Supreme Court Should Reject Phantom Losses and Reverse Broudo, 60 BUS. L. J. 533 
(2005). 
7 Dura indicated that “private securities-fraud actions resemble in many (but not all) respects common-law 
deceit and misrepresentation actions” and that litigants should examine these common-law roots to determine 
whether a plaintiff suffered an injury and economic loss.  Dura, 544 U.S. at 343.  The Court also noted, “The same is 
true in respect to a claim that a share’s higher price is lower than it would otherwise have been – a claim we do not 
consider here.”  Id.  As John Coffee observed, “to raise this issue is to suggest that it stands on the same logical 
footing as price inflation that results in a stock price decline.”  Coffee, Loss Causation After Dura: Something for 
Everyone, supra note 6, at 5.  Even before Dura, some courts suggested in dicta that stockholders may experience an 
actionable loss if stock does not appreciate as it would have absent the fraudulent conduct.  Gebhardt v. ConAgra 
Foods, Inc., 335 F.3d 824, 832 (8th Cir. 2003). 
8 The Court noted that its reasoning in Dura could also apply to “a claim that a share’s higher price is lower 
than it would otherwise have been – a claim we do not consider here.”  Id.  By mentioning the issue, the Court 
seemed to suggest that a price increase should be taken as seriously as a traditional stock price decline.  See Coffee, 
Loss Causation After Dura: Something for Everyone, supra note 6, at 5.   
4plaintiffs might not be limited to damages for traditional out-of-pocket losses.9 A number of 
intrinsic problems could result from compensating investors for more than these losses.  To cite 
but one example, providing investors with a double-recovery, one from the net stock price 
increase and one from class-action damages, could create a perverse incentive to invest 
purposefully in companies showing signs of fraud.10 
To illustrate these potential effects, consider the following situation:  
 
“We’ve Found Gold!,” claims Corporation in a half-page press 
release in the New York Times.  Corporation’s stock price 
increases from $10 a share to $50 a share.  An investor calls her 
broker and purchases ten shares at $50 per share.  Three-months 
later, Corporation announces in two-inch, bold, capital letters, 
“We’ve Found Platinum!” Beneath the capitals, small, footnoted 
text reads “but not gold.” The investor’s stock soars to $200 per 
share.  But she wants to recover for the inflation in her purchase 
price based upon the gold misrepresentation.11 
After Dura, assuming that she could meet the other elements of a claim, this investor might be 
able to maintain a securities class action against Corporation even though she did not suffer out-
of-pocket losses.12 Although some have argued that courts should expand private litigation 
remedies to deter this type of opportune disclosure,13 the better view is that courts should limit 
recovery to out-of-pocket losses and recognize that private remedies need not be invariably 
coextensive with enforcement by the Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”).14 
9 Securities fraud cases on the open market have typically involved a decline in the stock price after the 
disclosure of wrongdoing. 
10 One obvious ex ante indicia of fraud includes accounting restatements.  Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on 
Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1499 (2004). 
11 This example is adapted from the Supreme Court’s oral argument in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. 
Broudo. Transcript of Oral Argument, Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, available at 2005 WL 236546, 
(Jan. 12, 2005).  If the gold-platinum scenario sounds too hypothetical, consider a pharmaceutical company that 
announces higher than expected profits to create a market frenzy and later issues both a revised 10K filing revealing 
its past financial woes and announces that it received FDA approval for a new cancer-fighting drug.   
12 This scenario is not far-fetched.  The oral argument in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo 
contemplates but does not resolve this scenario.  Transcript of Oral Argument, Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 
U.S. 336, available at 2005 WL 236546, (Jan. 12, 2005).  For another example, see In re Columbia Sec. Litig., 155 
F.R.D. 466, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (observing that just because the price did not drop as a result of alleged 
misrepresentations did not preclude a fraud-on-the-market claim since the misrepresentations might have prevented 
a price rise that otherwise would have occurred).  The court in Gebhardt v. ConAgra Foods, Inc. seems to think that 
plaintiffs should be able to recover in this situation.  It observed that “stockholders can be damaged in ways other 
than seeing their stocks decline.”  335 F.3d at 83.  “If a stock does not appreciate as it would have absent the 
fraudulent conduct, investors have suffered a harm.”  Id. at 832. 
13 See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Understanding Dura, 60 BUS. LAW. 1547, 1558 (2005) (arguing that courts 
should accept a variety of evidence to demonstrate price inflation and that a price drop is not necessary for 
recovery). 
14 Although this article is not a defense of the securities class action – particularly when investors have not 
suffered from out-of-pocket losses – the securities class action has been defended in numerous circumstances.  See, 
e.g., James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497 (1997). 
5Private class-action litigation is problematic in the gold-platinum hypothetical because 
investors were already financially advantaged when the price appreciated above the purchase 
price.  Yet permitting corporate agents to escape liability through opportune disclosures15
impugns the stock market’s integrity and could adversely affect the economy.  Still, the option is 
not between private litigation and no enforcement.  Even without a private remedy, the SEC, the 
Department of Justice, and the exchanges themselves can penalize corporate wrongdoing.16 
Thus, limiting the availability of private class actions when investors do not experience an out-of-
pocket loss does not mean that fraud would go undeterred or unpunished.  Yet without a clear 
doctrinal statement limiting recovery to out-of-pocket losses, the securities class action is 
arguably available to recoup the inflation in the purchase price from the misleading gold 
misrepresentation.   
 
Compensating investors (who are corporate shareholders) when the net stock price 
increases, injures investors by requiring them to pay significant transaction costs, such as 
attorneys fees, to transfer wealth from one pocket to another.17 When investors sue a 
corporation, its shareholders indirectly bear those costs.  Because investors are diversified, they 
may belong to the shareholder group indirectly paying for the litigation on one day and may be 
in the class of investors suing a corporation on the next.  Thus, in the aggregate, compensating 
diversified investors when the net stock price increases is a costly means for wealth 
redistribution.  
 
Part I begins with a brief overview of securities laws to provide a contextual framework 
for approaching damage awards.  Part I then follows Dura’s directive to examine common-law 
deceit and misrepresentation actions for guidance on economic loss and damages in modern 
securities-fraud awards.18 As a result, this part also reviews courts’ criteria for awarding 
common-law contract and equity-based damages to determine whether the criteria also apply to 
open-market securities violations.   
 
Part II considers normative theories justifying the private securities class action as an 
enforcement tool.  Even though recovering damages after plaintiffs’ experience a net gain is 
problematic under the current system, perhaps the system should change if recovery further 
promoted the goals of the securities class action.  Yet, after analyzing compensation and 
deterrence as possible goals, I conclude that compensating plaintiffs for net gains redistributes 
 
15 Under the federal securities laws, corporations that have a duty to disclose must disclose all material 
information whether it is positive or negative.  This use of “disclosure” in this article implies bad news and that any 
subsequent class litigation is comprised of purchasers who allege that they bought the security based on a 
misrepresentation or omission. 
16 Unlike private actions, the SEC need not prove injury or damage to maintain a claim.  S.E.C. v. Rana 
Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1363 (9th Cir. 1993); S.E.C. v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993); ALAN R. 
BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, BROMBERG AND LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES 
FRAUD § 9:1 (2003).   
17 See infra pages 23-24 and accompanying footnotes. 
18 Securities fraud damages have long vexed courts. See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, Symposium, 
“Simplicity and Certainty” in the Measure of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5, 51 BUS. LAW. 1177, 1179 (1996). Two 
suggestions in Dura could increase unpredictability in awarding damages and thereby decrease deterrence.  First, 
Dura hints that plaintiffs might be able to sue when a security’s higher trading price is lower than it might have been 
absent the fraud.  Second, Dura observes that private securities fraud class actions resemble common-law deceit and 
misrepresentation actions – which permitted damages apart from out-of-pocket losses.   
6wealth among diversified shareholders (minus significant transaction costs) and may cause 
perverse effects on investor education and motivation.  Instead, deterrence is the most 
substantiated rationale for private recovery.  Nevertheless, without defining a criterion for 
awarding damages, the unpredictable nature of remedies in private class actions may decrease 
deterrence.  To foster optimal deterrence, courts need a defined method for calculating open-
market damages.  Part III proposes that this method limit recovery to out-of-pocket losses and 
thus compensate only net losers from the fraud.  This part also identifies and discusses the 
practical and theoretical ramifications of restricting recovery to investors who experienced a net 
out-of-pocket loss.  
 
My inquiry throughout this Article focuses exclusively on open-market damages for 
securities fraud in class action lawsuits; I do not advocate changing damage measures for face-to-
face transactions or for more traditional nonclass suits.  This Article takes for granted that the 
SEC, the Department of Justice, and the exchanges coexist with private litigation to deter fraud, 
that private class-based litigation can deter fraud with appropriate damage restrictions in place, 
that it is (sometimes) desirable to enforce Rule 10b-5 against non-issuing corporate defendants, 
and that courts will continue to use the fraud-on-the-market theory at least for awhile despite 
numerous academic challenges to the efficient capital markets hypothesis.  These assumptions 
are subject to ongoing debate, but they are beyond the scope of this Article’s focus on 
determining (a) whether the system should compensate investors through private actions when 
their stock price does not increase as much as it would have absent fraud and (b) whether limiting 
investors to their out-of-pocket losses in this regard could bolster fraud deterrence.   
I. MEASURING DAMAGES FROM OPEN MARKET LOSS 
The appropriate method for calculating economic loss and awarding damages for open-
market fraud has long proved problematic for courts.19 In all private securities fraud litigation, 
class actions or otherwise, damages are an essential prerequisite for maintaining a claim.20 Yet, 
because securities fraud class-action cases generally settle before courts calculate damages, 
opinions are scarce.21 Accordingly, this section begins with a brief securities laws overview to 
contextualize the purpose of private remedies.   
 
19 See Thompson, supra note 18, at 1179 (“The measure of recovery in a Rule 10b-5 action always has been 
confusing.  Not coincidentally, it always has been an afterthought in Rule 10b-5 case law.  Litigants seeking to 
establish the existence and the elements of a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5 were content to leave the 
measure of recovery to be resolved another day.”). 
20 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2006); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005). 
21 Miller v. Asensio & Co., Inc., 364 F.3d 223 (4th Cir. 2004) (“The treatises note the ‘relative paucity of 
decisions’ dealing with damages in Rule 10b-5 cases.”) (quoting THOMAS L. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION § 12.12, at 528 (2002)); 3 ALAN R. BLOOMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, BLOOMBERG & LOWENFELS 
ON SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD, § 9.1, at 9.10.14 n. 6 (2003); Daniel P. Lefler et al., Just How Much 
Damage Did Those Misrepresentations Actually Cause and To Whom?: Damages Measurement in “Fraud on the 
Market” Securities Class Actions, 1505 PLI/Corp 285, 289 (2005); Thompson, supra note 18, at 1179; Donald C. 
Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 639, 648 (1996); Bradford 
Cornell & R. Gregory Morgan, Using Finance Theory to Measure Damages in Fraud on the Market Cases, 37 
UCLA L. REV. 883, 884 (1990). 
7A. Contextualizing Securities Laws to Provide a Framework to Understand Damage Awards 
 
As early as 1975, the Supreme Court recognized that the securities class action “presents 
a danger of vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that which accompanies litigation 
in general.”22 Consequently, during the 1990s, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”)23 to rein in prolific use of the 193324 and 193425 Exchange Acts.  
 
In passing the PSLRA, Congress stated that private securities litigation was “an 
indispensable tool with which defrauded investors can recover their losses.”26 But it also 
observed that the class action device, as then used in securities litigation, injured “the entire U.S. 
economy.”27 The Act’s supporters alleged that class-action lawyers filed frivolous complaints28
and targeted deep-pocket defendants,29 which produced blackmail settlements,30 discouraged 
qualified people from serving on boards of directors, and placed heavy economic burdens on 
both corporations and the economy as a whole.31 
As a result of these arguments, Title I of the PSLRA limits recoverable damages and 
attorneys’ fees, creates a “safe harbor” for forward-looking statements,32 requires sanctions for 
frivolous litigation,33 and provides a mechanism to stay discovery pending a judicial review of a 
motion to dismiss.34 The limit on recoverable damages entitles plaintiffs to receive only the 
 
22 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).  Certainly not everyone believed that 
securities class actions caused all of the pernicious effects that the proponents of the PSLRA and SLUSA attributed 
to them.  See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 727, 743-44 (1995). 
23 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1, 78u.  The PSLRA has been criticized for making it more difficult to bring class 
actions in general rather than weeding out the nonmeritorious ones.  See, e.g., See A.C. Prichard, Markets as 
Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 
960 (1999) (“But the procedural obstacles of the Reform Act do not screen out only frivolous suits: Instead, the 
Reform Act makes it harder to bring class actions, whatever their individual merit.”). 
24 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2006). 
25 15 U.S.C. § 78a. 
26 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S.Ct. 1503, 1509 (2006) (quoting the House 
Conference Report, 109 Stat. 737). 
27 H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995). 
28 See Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 308 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Legislators were apparently motivated in large 
part by a perceived need to deter strike suits wherein opportunistic private plaintiffs file securities fraud claims of 
dubious merit in order to extract large settlement recoveries.”). 
29 H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995). 
30 For a discussion of the general theory of blackmail in the class action setting, see L. Elizabeth Chamblee, 
Unsettling Efficiency: When Non-Class Aggregation of Mass Torts Creates Second-Class Settlements, 65 LA. L. 
REV. 157, 222 (2004). 
31 Id.; S. Rep. No. 98, 104th Cong, 1st Sess. 8-10 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679. 
32 “Deterrence is further undermined by the safe harbor that the Reform Act creates for forward-looking 
statements.  The safe harbor immunizes such statements if they were not knowingly false when made, a departure 
from the ordinary standard of recklessness.”  Prichard, supra note 23, at 962.  
33 15 U.S.C. § 78v-4(c) (2006); see also Choi, supra note 10, at 1469-74. 
34 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4; see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S.Ct. 1503, 1511 
(2006); Felton v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 2006 WL 1149184, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2006).  Some 
have observed that these reforms crippled the securities class action and undermined its application to, for example, 
forward looking statements.  See, e.g., Cox, supra note 14, at 497 (defending the securities class action on both 
deterrent and compensatory grounds).  Others have argued that the PSLRA may chill meritorious actions just as 
much as it does frivolous actions.  See, e.g., Hillary Sale, Heightened Pleadings and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of 
the Effect of the PSLRA’s Internal-Information Standard on ’33 and ’34 Act Claims, 76 WASH. U. L. Q. 537, 537-38 
8difference between the sale price of the security and the security’s mean price over a ninety-day 
period following disclosure of the information.35 Title I also mandates heightened pleading 
requirements for §10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims that require plaintiffs to specify each misleading 
statement and to provide particular facts showing that the defendant acted with the required state 
of mind.36 Even though Congress has demonstrated a steadfast commitment to insuring market 
integrity, most of its reforms have erected barriers to class action recovery.     
 
Stringent pleading requirements are one of the principal barriers to private recovery.  
Plaintiffs must allege the following elements to state a claim for cases involving publicly traded 
securities: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter; (3) a connection with the 
purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance; (5) economic loss; (6) loss causation.37 For loss 
causation and standing purposes, plaintiffs must allege an injury to a legally protected interest 
and a causal relationship between the injury (the economic loss) and the defendant’s conduct.38 
Defendant’s conduct must, therefore, proximately cause plaintiffs’ loss.39 
Causation has two components: transactional causation and loss causation.40 Because 
many individuals turn their finances over to investment brokers and might not be aware of a 
misstatement (or omission), much less have relied on it, plaintiffs may plead transactional 
 
(1998). The problem is that many times the use of discovery is the only way that plaintiffs can find viable facts to 
plead a strong inference of wrongdoing.  See Prichard, supra note 23, at 961; Jordan Eth & Michael Dicke, Insider 
Stock Sales in Rule 10b-5 Corporate Disclosure Cases: Separating the Innocent From the Suspicious, 1 STAN. J.L. 
BUS. & FIN. 97, 105 (1994). 
35 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2)(1), (2).  Still, this leaves open the possibility of recovery insinuated by Dura, that a 
plaintiff might recover when the price does not increase as much as it otherwise would have.   
36 Dabit, 126 S.Ct. at 1511 (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005) (internal 
citations omitted)).  Professors Grundfest and Prichard have commented on the legislative ambiguity of “strong 
inference” in their 2002 Stanford Law Review article.  Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Prichard, Statutes with Multiple 
Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627 
(2002).  The “strong inference” standard first appeared in Senate Bill 240.  Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
of 1995, S. 240, 104th Cong. § 36(b) (1995). 
37 Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005).   
38 With regard to loss causation, “the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the act or omission of 
the defendant alleged to violate this chapter caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages.”  15 
U.S.C. §78u-4(b)(4) (2006); see also Barr v. Matria Healthcare, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 2004); 
Gaines v. Guidant Corp., 2004 WL 2538374, *18 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 8, 2004) (quoting Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 
F.3d 456, 468 (7th Cir. 2003); Packer v. Yampol, 630 F. Supp. 1237, 1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); see also Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); Pasley v. Freeman, 3 T.R. 5:1, 100 Eng. Rep. 450, 457 (1789) (if 
“no injury is occasioned by the lie, it is not actionable: but if it be attended with a damage it then becomes the 
subject of an action.”).  In securities fraud litigation under Rule 10b-5, the PSLRA includes an “additional” 
requirement that the plaintiff prove that the defendant’s act or omission “caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks 
to recover damages.”  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4).   
39 Theoharous v. Fong, 256 F.3d 1219, 1224 (11th Cir. 2001). Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 forbids (1) the “use or employ[ment]” of any “deceptive device,” (2) “in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security,” and (3) “in contravention of” Securities and Exchange Commission “rules and regulations.”  
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).  Binder v. Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 1999); Friedlander v. Troutman, Sanders, 
Lockerman & Ashmore, 788 F.2d 1500, 1503 n. 3 (11th Cir.1986) (quoting Diamond v. Lamotte, 709 F.2d 1419, 
1422-23 (11th Cir. 1983)) (citations omitted);  see also Ross v. Bank South, N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 728 (11th Cir. 
1989) (en banc); In re Healthsouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.R.D. 447, 458 (N.D. Ala. 2003).   
40 Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc. 116 F.3d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir. 1997); see, e.g., Emergent Capital Inv. 
Mgmt. v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2003). 
9causation by alleging “fraud-on-the-market” if the market is “efficient.”41 The fraud-on-the-
market theory establishes a rebuttable presumption that investors rely on material representations 
made to the public in determining whether to buy or sell a particular security.42 Thus, the theory 
satisfies both reliance and transaction causation.43 To satisfy the second causation component, 
loss causation, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant “caused the loss for which the 
plaintiff seeks to recover damages.”44 And yet, even though they are interrelated, there is a 
distinction between loss causation, economic loss, and damages.  As measured by the out-of-
pocket rule, damages compensate plaintiffs only for losses actually caused by a 
misrepresentation or omission.45 So, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the defendant’s 
misrepresentation or omission caused the loss for which they seek to recover damages.46
B. Dura’s Potential Impact on Remedies 
 
The few opinions available on open-market damages generally limit plaintiffs’ recovery 
to out-of-pocket losses; yet, the damage issue has been subject to ongoing debate in the lower 
courts.  The Supreme Court had the occasion to end this debate in Dura but opted to issue a 
narrow opinion instead.  This section briefly examines Dura, both in terms of what the decision 
did and did not do, and aims to move beyond the current confusion over damages through 
exploring its sources.   
 
In Dura, the plaintiffs alleged that Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. made false statements 
about its profits and about the Food and Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) likely approval of its 
asthmatic spray device.  When Dura later disclosed that its earnings would not be as high as 
expected due to slow drug sales, its shares lost almost one-half of their value.  Eight months 
later, when it announced that the FDA would not approve the device, its market price fell again 
 
41 Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 224 (1988).  For an explanation of how Basic fits into the 
subsequent work of behavioral finance researchers, see Ribstein, supra note 6, at 148-50. 
Academics have repeatedly challenged the validity of the efficient market theory.  Although academic 
debate over market efficiency continues, as Donald Langevoort observes, the fraud-on-the-market theory can be 
justified regardless of whether markets are efficient.  Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock 
Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135, 154 (2002) (citing Donald C. 
Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 
876-86 (1992)).   
42 See Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2000); In re Salomon Analyst 
Metromedia, 2006 WL 1716873 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2006); O’Neil v. Appel, 165 F.R.D. 479, 500 (W.D. Mich. 
1996); In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 738 F. Supp. 825, 836 (D. Del. 1990).  Some have argued that the loss 
causation element makes no sense in fraud-on-the-market transactions because the injury flows directly from the 
misstatement.  See, e.g., Fox, supra note 13, at 1549-50.  This oversimplifies the issue.  As we have seen, when a 
misrepresentation fails to produce economic damage, but the stock price declines because of market conditions, then 
a plaintiff should not  able to recover.  The misstatement was (a) not material as evidenced by a lack of market 
response and (b) not the product of the later loss.  To hold otherwise is to provide investor insurance for tough 
market conditions. 
43 Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005); Basic, 485 U.S. at 241; Robbins v. Koger 
Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Edward A. Dyl, Estimating Economic Damages in Class 
Action Securities Fraud Litigation, J. FORENSIC ECON. 12(1), at 1 (1999). 
44 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2006). 
45 Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1447 n. 5 (11th Cir. 1997). 
46 Id. 
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but recovered within a week.  Even though stock price recovered quickly, plaintiffs argued that 
they suffered a loss by paying artificially inflated prices for Dura’s stock.47
Although a number of commentators anticipated a decision that plaintiffs could not plead 
loss causation without demonstrating a decline in stock value and thus a net loss,48 the Court’s 
decision settled only one issue: that a plaintiff who alleged and established that the defendant 
made a materially false statement had not done enough to establish loss causation without 
connecting the loss to the misrepresentation.49 This holding may change the way that 
corporations reveal adverse information.  For example, after Dura, the corporation may bundle 
adverse and favorable information, as in the gold-platinum hypothetical, in order to prevent a 
stock price decline.50 
The Court also recognized that intervening factors could cause a lower price instead of 
the misrepresentation, but then it added in dicta: “The same is true in respect to a claim that a 
share’s higher price is lower than it would otherwise have been – a claim we do not consider 
here.”51 The Court then reemphasized the importance of common-law deceit and 
misrepresentation actions in deciphering economic loss and damages.52 
C. The Evolution of Securities Fraud Damages  
 
Even though modern-day securities fraud shares some elements with common-law deceit 
and misrepresentation actions, courts applying the common law dealt primarily with non-liquid 
markets and face-to-face transactions.  Moreover, because of these differences, courts did not 
limit common-law damages to out-of-pocket losses.53 Instead, they fashioned awards out of 
numerous damage theories including the benefit-of-the-bargain rule,54 the out-of-pocket rule,55 
47 Dura, 544 U.S. at 340. This type of allegation did not adequately plead loss causation because a 
purchaser could quickly sell the shares before the relevant truth began to leak out.  Thus, a seller’s alleged 
misrepresentation (and its associated inflated price) did not invariably lead to a loss, but might mean a later loss.  
Accordingly, loss causation limits a plaintiff’s recovery for out-of-pocket damages when the loss caused by the 
fraud is actually less than the out-of-pocket measure. See id. 
48 See, e.g., Coffee, Loss Causation After Dura: Something for Everyone, supra note 6, at 5. 
49 Fox, supra note 13, at 1548. 
50 John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation: New Doctrine Spawns New Tactics, N.Y.L.J. 5 (May 18, 2006, col. 1). 
51 Dura, 544 U.S. at 343.   
52 Id.  As John Coffee observed, “to raise this issue is to suggest that it stands on the same logical footing as 
price inflation that results in a stock price decline.”  Coffee, Loss Causation After Dura: Something for Everyone,
supra note 6, at 5. 
53 The elements for common-law fraud are similar to the elements for pleading securities fraud.  At 
common-law, the plaintiff had to demonstrate by “clear and decisive proof” “that the defendant has made a 
representation in regard to a material fact”; “that such representation is false”; “that such representation was not 
actually believed by the defendant, on reasonable grounds, to be true”; “that it was made with intent that it should be 
acted on”; “that it was acted on by complainant to his damage; and, “that in so acting on it the complainant was 
ignorant of its falsity, and reasonably believed it to be true”.  So. Dev. Co. of Nevada v. Silva, 125 U.S. 247, 250 
(1888).  This case was cited by the Supreme Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. at 343. 
54 See, e.g., Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107, 114 (2d Cir. 1981).  But see Smith v. Bolles, 132 U.S. 125 
(1889).  In Smith v. Bolles the Supreme Court rejected the benefit-of-the-bargain rule because it included the 
“expected fruits of an unrealized speculation.”  It reasoned that when the asserted facts created only “speculation” 
they were not material.  For a discussion of this case see Michael J. Kaufman, No Foul, No Harm: The Real 
Measure of Damages Under Rule 10b-5, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 29, 35-36 (1989). 
55 See, e.g., Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328, 334 (2d Cir. 1971) (“Under the ‘general’ laws regime of 
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 10 (1842), the rule in the federal courts was that a defrauded buyer of securities is entitled 
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disgorgement,56 and rescission.57 One commentator noted that the cases contain “a mélange of 
rules” and that “all too often a court will give up and announce that the district court has 
discretion to fashion ‘a remedy to suit the particular case’ – as if there were no need for legal 
rules to evaluate the significance and effects of the facts of ‘the particular case.’”58 Nevertheless, 
given the potential for Dura to affect class damages in new ways, this section traces the 
development from common-law deceit and misrepresentation remedies to remedies for face-to-
face transactions to open-market fraud.  It then explains why some of these common-law 
principles do not hold true for modern fraud-on-the-market actions.  
(1) Common-Law Origins of Confusion  
 
In the early 1600s, deceit claims existed only for what is today termed a breach of 
warranty.  In the seminal common-law damages case, Chandelor v. Lopus, the Exchequer 
Chamber reversed the Kings Bench’s judgment in the plaintiff’s favor because no breach of 
warranty occurred – the defendant never warranted that the object in question was a “bezoar 
stone.”59 Yet at least some justices believed that the defendant’s intent to deceive was actionable 
even without a warranty.60 This line of thinking continued to develop through the years, and by 
the late eighteenth century, the law was relatively well-established that (1) if there was an 
express or implied warranty, the seller could be liable if the product did not conform to the 
warranty’s specifications and (2) if no warranty existed, the seller could be liable only where she 
made a false statement, knew of its falsity, and intended to deceive the buyer.61 
Of course, a breach of warranty action is founded in contract law; deceit is a tort.  
Though the difference initially appears to be either the presence or absence of a warranty, this 
simplistic distinction caused multiple procedural and pleading issues since plaintiffs often 
 
to recover only the excess of what he paid over the value of what he got, not, as some other courts had held, the 
difference between the value of what he got and what it was represented he would be getting.”). 
56 See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972) (“In our view, the 
correct measure of damages under s 28 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. s 78bb(a), is the difference between the fair value of all 
that the mixed-blood seller received and the fair value of what he would have received had there been no fraudulent 
conduct, except for the situation where the defendant received more than the seller’s actual loss.  In the latter case 
damages are the amount of the defendant’s profit.”) (internal citations omitted). 
57 See, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38, (2d Cir. 1978).  But see Green v. 
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1342 (9th Cir. 1975) (Sneed, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the result in part) (“The rescissory measure of damages does not properly measure that loss.  The reason is that it 
permits a defrauded purchaser to place upon the defendant the burden of any decline in the value of the stock 
between the date of purchase and the date of disclosure of the fraud even though only a portion of that decline may 
have been proximately caused by the defendant’s wrong.”).  As to the different types of damages, see W. PAGE 
KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 110 (1984); 
Kaufman, supra note 54, at 30. 
58 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 3, at 612 (quoting Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1121 (10th 
Cir. 1982)). 
59 79 Eng. Rep. 3-4, Cro. Jac. 4, Eng. Ct. Exch. 1603; Paula J. Dalley, The Law of Deceit, 1790-1860: 
Continuity Amidst Change, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 405, 412 (1995).  A bezoar stone is a sort of stone found in the 
intestine of hooved animals that was believed to be a universal antidote against poisons.  Unfortunately, the case of 
Chandelor v. Lopus does not explain how the buyer realized that the bezoar stone did not work.   
60 Lopus v. Chandler (K.B. 1606), reprinted in J.H. BAKER & S.F.C. MILSOM, SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL 
HISTORY, PRIVATE LAW TO 1750, 521 (1986). 
61 Dalley, supra note 59, at 413; see also Stuart v. Wilkins, 99 E.R. 15, 1 Dougl. 18 (K.B. 1778). 
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hedged their bets by alleging both breach of warranty and deceit.62 Hence, in common-law deceit 
and misrepresentation actions, the court chose among a buffet of remedies.63 Depending upon 
the circumstances, a common-law claim for deceit could prompt the following counts in a 
complaint: (1) breach of warranty and breach of contract – requesting benefit-of-the-bargain, or 
“expectation” damages, to restore the plaintiff to the position she would have been in with the 
defendant’s contractual performance;64 (2) misrepresentation – a tort – which could provide 
recoupment for out-of-pocket losses; and (3) unjust enrichment – an equitable claim – which 
might require the defendant to return the illicit profit from the transaction or rescind the 
transaction altogether.65
(2) Remedies for Fraudulent Face-to-Face Transactions 
 
Over the years, courts blurred the distinct remedies for these multiple causes of action, 
which contributed to modern-day confusion over the appropriate remedy for open-market 
securities fraud.66 Still, the courts did not move directly from common-law deceit and 
misrepresentation into open-market fraud.  They first applied common-law remedies to face-to-
face transactions and typically awarded either recessionary damages based upon the defendant’s 
gain or out-of-pocket damages based upon the plaintiff’s loss.67
The out-of-pocket measure, which originated in tort law,68 requires the defendant to 
return the losses she proximately caused.  Thus, this measure only reimburses plaintiffs who 
were economically harmed by the defendant’s misconduct.69 In securities fraud, these damages 
compensate plaintiffs for “the difference between the price paid and the ‘real’ value of the 
 
62 See Bartholomew v. Bushnell, 20 Conn. 271 (1850); Dalley, supra note 59, at 414-15 (“The best course, 
from the plaintiff’s point of view, would be to raise both claims and hope that, at trial, he would be able to prove 
either warranty or intent.  The plaintiff could accomplish this maneuver by bringing one writ and offering evidence 
of both kinds, or by joining the two actions.”). 
63 Thompson, supra note 18, at 1184; Robert B. Thompson, The Measure of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5: A 
Restitution Alternative to Tort Damages, 37 VAND. L. REV. 349, 353-54 (1984). 
64 Note, however, that the Uniform Commercial Code does not recognize an implied warranty with regard 
to securities.  See U.C.C. § 2-105(1), 8-306(2). 
65 See, e.g., Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965); see also Thompson, supra note 63, at 353-
54. 
66 The break-down between separate and distinct causes of action may have simply been confusion.  As 
Dalley observes, “[i]n Waters v. Mattingly, 4 Ky. 244, 246 (1808), Judge Edwards clearly understood the difference 
between the requirement of warranty and the requirement of sciens, but unfortunately he thought the distinction 
arose from the distinction between a suppression veri and a suggestion falsi.”  Dalley, supra note 59, at 41 n. 36. 
67 See Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 358-59 (1986); Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United 
States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972) (note, however, that this is not a fraud-on-the-market case); Jordan v. Duff & 
Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 441-42 (7th Cir. 1987); Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Ellis, 810 F.2d 700, 706-07 (7th Cir. 
1987) (“In an action under § 10(b), the plaintiff cannot take advantage of the recessionary remedies provided 
elsewhere in the securities laws. . . . Sometimes remedies under the securities laws are based on defendants’ gain 
rather than plaintiffs’ loss, or plaintiff may have an election.”). 
68 Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), was the first case to invoke tort principles 
for an implied right of action under rule 10b-5.  Judge Kilpatrick’s decision in Kardon was “adopted by an 
‘overwhelming consensus of the District Courts and Courts of Appeals.”  Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S.Ct. 1503, 1509 (2006) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 
(1975)).  The Second Circuit later limited the breadth of the Rule 10b-5 private action in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel 
Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952). 
69 Kaufman, supra note 54, at 129-30. 
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security, i.e., the fair market value absent the misrepresentations, at the time of the initial 
purchase.”70 The “real value,” or “true value” as it is often termed, means the price absent the 
fraud.71 Accordingly, courts often determine whether the investor was a net winner or a net loser 
from the fraud.72 Under the out-of-pocket theory, an investor with net monetary gains has no 
damage and cannot recover.73 It follows then that an investor who realized more than her initial 
investment – as in the gold-platinum hypothetical – could not recover.      
 
In face-to-face transactions, courts also awarded common-law remedies based on contract 
law and equity.  The frequency of these awards increased after Judge Aldrich’s opinion in 
Janigan v. Taylor.74 Judge Aldrich thought disgorgement was appropriate because it was better 
“to give the defrauded party the benefit even of windfalls than to let the fraudulent party keep 
them.”75 Therefore, courts reasoned that they should not treat one who committed fraud any 
 
70 Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1447 n. 5 (11th Cir. 1997) (internal citation omitted); see 
also Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436-37 (9th Cir. 1987); Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 
F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1982); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1981); Green v. Occidental Petroleum 
Corp., 541 F.2d 1355, 1344-46 (9th Cir. 1976) (concurring opinion); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 908-09 (9th 
Cir. 1975).  The out-of-pocket measure is the most common in calculating damages in securities fraud class actions.  
Blackie, 524 F.2d at 908-09. 
71 Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 661-62 (1986); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 
128, 155 (1972); Mathews v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., 260 F.3d 239, 249 (3d Cir. 2001); Ambassador Hotel 
Co., Ltd. v. Wei-Chuan Inv., 189 F.3d 1017, 1030 (9th Cir. 1999); Alexander, supra note 2, at 1491; Thompson, 
supra note 18, at 1181. The difficulty with the out-of-pocket measure is that no simple means exists for determining 
the value on the day of the transaction.  Thompson, supra note 18, at 1180. Further, some courts have used the value 
of the stock on a day other than the day that the transaction occurred, such as when the defendant disclosed the 
correction.  See, e.g., Harris v. Am. Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 226 (8th Cir. 1975); Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 
35, 43-44 (10th Cir. 1971); Esplin v. Hirsch, 402 F.2d 94, 104-05 (10th Cir. 1968).  It is the plaintiffs’ burden to 
provide evidence of the “true value” for each date during the class period.  Sowell v. Butcher & Singer, Inc., 926 
F.2d 289, 297 (3d Cir. 1991).  Consequently, this modified measure could increase plaintiffs’ damage calculation by 
including market changes such as a declining market rather than only loss from the fraud.  Thompson, supra note 
18, at 1191. 
72 See, e.g., In re Cardinal Health, Inc. Sec. Litig., 226 F.R.D. 298, 308 (S.D. Ohio 2005); In re Comdisco 
Sec. Litig., 150 F. Supp. 2d 943 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (determining that a pension fund was “out of the running for 
designation of lead plaintiff” since it “derived a net gain of almost $300,000 . . . from its purchases and sales during 
the Class Period”); In re McKesson HBOC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 97 F. Supp. 2d 993, 996-97 (N.D. Ca. 1999) (rejecting 
the net seller as lead plaintiff and observing that a net purchaser might have more interest in the litigation because it 
was induced by the fraud to purchase shares and was left “holding the bag” when the fraud was revealed). 
73 See, e.g., Arenson v. Broadcom Corp., 2004 WL 3253646 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2004) (granting defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs who benefited from the alleged inflation); see also Fox, supra note 13, 
at 1553 (noting that if the price increased, “application of the loss causation rule developed in the context of a 
traditional reliance-based action would bar recovery” because it “required that the purchased security decline in 
value from what was paid (or was sold at a loss)” and that the decline is “reasonably related to the falsity of the 
statement that induced the purchase”). 
74 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965).   
75 Id.; see also Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 663 (1986) (citing Janigan, 344 F.2d at 786); Rude v. 
Campbell Square, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 1040, 1050 (D.S.D. 1976).  In Janigan, the defendant, who was president, 
general manager, and director of Boston Electro Steel Casting, Inc, purchased stock from his shareholders without 
telling them that the corporation was going through a revitalization.  After two years, the stock’s value multiplied.  
The court reasoned that if it awarded the difference between the market price of the stock at the time of the sale and 
the price paid to plaintiffs, the damages would have been minimal.  Instead, the court rationalized that the fair value 
of the stock when sold was not the market price, but the market price of what the stock would have been if the 
market knew what the defendant knew. 
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better than a defendant who only breached a contract.76 And so, depending on what justice 
required, they began to use benefit-of-the-bargain awards, rescission, and disgorgement as 
remedies.77
The benefit-of-the-bargain remedy is based in contract law and compensates plaintiffs for 
the amount they would have received, including profits, if the defendant performed as 
promised.78 Both rescission and disgorgement79 are equitable remedies that are also used in 
contract law.  As applied to face-to-face securities fraud cases, courts have required defendants 
to disgorge, or return, their unjust enrichment so that the plaintiff recovers the fraudulently 
obtained profit.80 Rescissory damages aim to rescind the transaction and to put the plaintiff in 
the same position she would have occupied if the transaction never occurred.81 These damages 
require that the defendant pay not only for the fraud but also for the change in market 
conditions.82 So, in the process of undoing a securities transaction, the plaintiff avoids both the 
harm from the fraud as well as the danger of failing market conditions.83 Requiring the 
 
76 See, e.g., United States v. Ben Grunstein & Sons, Co., 137 F. Supp. 197, 208-10 (D.N.J. 1956); Stout v. 
Martin, 104 S.E. 157 (W. Va. 1920).   
77 Ben Grunstein & Sons, Co., 137 F. Supp. at 208-10; Stout, 104 S.E. at 157.  Both the courts and the drafters of the 
Restatement of Torts recognized that benefit-of-the-bargain damages were preferable in fraud actions particularly 
when the out-of-pocket measure did not afford “just and satisfactory” compensation.  Id. Courts agreed with this 
rationale.  See, e.g., Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107 (C.A.N.Y. 1981); William Prosser, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 110, at 733-34 (1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549(2), cmt. on (2) (1977). 
78 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). 
79 Disgorgement is “[t]he act of giving up something (such as profits illegally obtained) on demand or by 
legal compulsion.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).  In this context, disgorgement aims to prevent 
wrongdoers from unjustly enriching themselves, not to compensate victims.  S.E.C. v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 117 
(2d Cir. 2006); S.E.C. v. Tome, 833 F.2d 1086, 1096 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[T]he primary purpose of disgorgement is not 
to compensate investors.”); S.E.C. v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706, 713 (6th Cir. 1985). 
80 Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972).  “The primary purpose of 
disgorgement orders is to deter violations of the securities laws by depriving violators of their ill-gotten gains.”  
S.E.C. v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1997).  Although these funds are often used to compensate 
victims of the wrongdoing, the goal of compensation is secondary to that of deterrence.  Id.; see also S.E.C. v. 
Commonwealth Chem. Securities, Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 1978). 
81 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).  Merritt Fox has argued that rescissory damages should be 
used for securities fraud cases.  Merritt B. Fox, Demystifying Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Actions, 60 BUS.
LAW. 507, 512-13 (2005). 
82 Thompson, supra note 18, at 1183.  This remedy is “rooted in the contract of sale” and as Judge Joseph 
Sneed believed: 
 
This remedy imposes upon the wrongful seller the burden of any loss in the 
value of the stock between the date of sale and the disclosure date.  This is 
appropriate because the wrongful seller as a direct consequence of his wrong 
shifted to the purchaser the risks the seller would have borne but for the 
wrongful sale.  The seller’s obligation is to accept the return of the risk he 
wrongfully shifted in the contract of sale.  That is, it springs from his contractual 
undertaking. 
 
Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1343 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J. concurring). 
83 Thompson, supra note 18, at 1182-83.  Some courts have even applied a rescissionary measure for open 
market situations.  See, e.g., U.S. v. Grabske, 260 F. Supp. 2d 866 (N.D. Cal. 2002).  The Grabske court pondered 
how they might apply rescissionary damages as follows: 
 
15
defendant to bear the risk of market decline differentiates rescissory damages from out-of-pocket 
damages, which seek to isolate the price due to fraud and permit recovery only for that 
difference.84 Although this rationale makes sense as applied to face-to-face transactions where 
the plaintiff sells stock that skyrockets in value after the sale and the defendant acquires the stock 
by fraud, it does not hold true for secondary open-market transactions.85 
(3) Remedies for Fraud-on-the-Market 
 
In face-to-face transactions, the wrongdoer’s obligation to accept the returned risk of 
failing market conditions is founded in the sale contract.86 In the open-market situation, on the 
other hand, the corporate defendant does not sell anything directly to the plaintiff.87 Instead, the 
plaintiff purchases stock from others on the open market and the corporate defendant’s 
 
Assuming a sale and purchase of stock, true rescission would involve a return, 
on the one hand, of the purchase price and, on the other hand, of the stock 
purchased.  In an open market setting the injured party “returns the stock” by 
selling it on the open market.  The defendant “returns the purchase price” by 
compensating the injured party for any difference between the price that the 
injured party paid for the security and its trading price following the disclosure 
of the fraud. 
 
Id. at 872 (internal citations omitted).  Given the nature of the loss causation requirement after Dura, it stands to 
reason that private plaintiffs should no longer be permitted to recover rescissory damages.  See infra Part III.A.1.   
84 See Doyle v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 59 P.2d 1171 (Mont. 1936); Poole v. Camden, 92 S.E. 454 (W. 
Va. 1916); Beare v. Wright, 103 N.W. 632, 634 (N.D. 1905); Thompson, supra note 18, at 1182-83.   
85 See Kaufman, supra note 54, at 43-44. Accordingly, a growing number of courts refuse to award 
rescissionary damages in section 10(b) cases.  See, e.g., Mathews v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., 260 F.3d 239, 249 
(3d Cir. 2001) (“[I]n most §10(b) cases, we are extremely hesitant to award rescissionary damages and instead apply 
an ‘out of pocket measure.’”); Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc., 903 F.2d 186, 203 n. 25 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(“Although the Supreme Court has reserved the question whether a rescissionary measure of damages is ever 
appropriate for defrauded buyers under Rule 10b-5, this court has expressed clear disapproval of a damage theory 
that would insure defrauded buyers against downside market risk unrelated to fraud.”); Huddleston v. Hearman & 
MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 555 (5th Cir. 1981), modified on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983).  The Fifth Circuit 
explained its reasoning as follows: 
 
[T]he rescissional measure permits the defrauded securities buyer to place upon 
the defendant the burden of any decline in the value of the securities between the 
date of purchase and the date of sale even though only a portion of that decline 
may have been proximately caused by the defendant’s wrong . . . . Under these 
circumstances, the rescissional measure is unjust insofar as it compensates an 
investor for the nonspecific risks which he assumes by entering the market.  
Losses thus accruing have no relation to either the benefits derived by the 
defendants from the fraud or to the blameworthiness of their conduct. 
 
Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 555. 
86 See Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1343 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring). 
87 See id.; Fox, supra note 13, at 1548 (“Fraud-on-the-market actions such as Dura are very different from 
traditional reliance-based actions.  The plaintiff in a traditional reliance-based action is typically a purchaser 
involved in either a face-to-face transaction in shares of a non-publicly traded issuer or an IPO.”). 
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misrepresentations do not shift the risk of loss.88 The corporation cannot return a purchase price 
it never received.89
Nevertheless, enterprise liability foists most of the fraud’s cost on diversified 
shareholders who are not responsible for the fraud.90 Put another way, plaintiffs generally bring 
Rule 10b-5 fraud-on-the-market actions against nonissuing parties (the corporations); thus, there 
is no sale contract or privity between the plaintiff and defendant.91 When there is no direct 
transaction or contract between the plaintiff-investor and the corporate defendant (and thus no 
privity), it makes little sense to award contract-based damages.92 Consequently, remedies of 
contract rescission and rescissory damages cannot be justified on a restitution theory.93
The justification for disgorgement is likewise misplaced.  Disgorgement assumes that 
fraud unjustly enriched the defendant.94 But, in the open market, the plaintiff does not exchange 
 
88 See Green, 541 F.2d at 1343; Alexander, supra note 2, at 1496; cf Thompson, supra note 63, at 386 
(noting that “[r]isks of change in the market that occur within a reasonable time following the discovery of fraud 
shift to the defendants, while risks of market changes after that time fall on the plaintiff”). 
 89 See Green, 541 F.2d at 1343; Alexander, supra note 2, at 1496.  Because each purchase in the secondary 
open market corresponds to a sale, just as many market participants benefit from the fraud as are damaged. See In re 
Clearly Canadian Sec. Litig., 875 F. Supp. 1410, 1415 n. 3 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 3, at 
635.   
90 Arlen & Carney, supra note 4, at 699. 
91 Ross v. Bank South, N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 743 (11th Cir. 1989) (Tjoflat, Judge, specially concurring);  In 
re Letterman Bros. Energy Sec. Litig., 799 F.2d 967, 972 (5th Cir. 1986); Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 
F.2d 534, 554-55 (5th Cir. 1981), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983) (“Use of the 
rescissional measure is usually limited to cases involving either privity between plaintiff or defendant or some 
specific fiduciary duty owed by brokers to their customers.”); Philip J. Leas, Note, The Measure of Damages in Rule 
10b-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 26 STAN. L. REV. 371, 376 (1974). 
92 Ross, 885 F.2d at 743 (finding rescission an inappropriate remedy in a Rule 10b-5 action against non-
issuing parties).  Judge Tjoflat explained his thoughts that rescission is inappropriate as follows: 
 
In a Rule 10b-5 action against non-issuing parties, courts may not grant 
rescission as a remedy.  Rescission is an equitable remedy that restores parties to 
a transaction to their status quo ante.  Typically a buyer discovers a seller’s 
fraud, promptly tenders the goods to the seller, and demands the return of his 
purchase price.  The court then orders the seller to return the purchase price and 
uses its civil contempt power to coerce the seller’s compliance with its order.  
This remedy is available, however, only against parties to a contract – a court 
may not order rescission in a buyer’s action against a defrauding party who is 
not a party to the contract of sale.  Thus, in the context of Rule 10b-5, where 
buyers often sue parties that are not in privity of contract with the buyer, 
rescission is unavailable. 
 
Id.; Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 554-55; see also  Thompson, supra note 18, at 1185 (“In open market transactions 
when the defendants have made misleading statements to the market, the plaintiffs trade not with the defendants but 
with strangers in the market.  These alternative remedies are not likely to be available in that setting.”); Leas, supra 
note 91, at 376. 
93 Green, 541 F.2d at 1343. 
94 Disgorgement plays an important deterrence role in face-to-face transactions, but does not translate into 
open-market transactions.  For some examples of how disgorgement operates in other securities enforcement 
actions, see S.E.C. v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int’l, Inc., 401 F.2d 1031, 1047 (9th Cir. 2005).  Disgorgement is generally 
paid to victims of wrongdoing only when the victims can establish an equitable claim to the funds.  See S.E.C. v. 
Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).  When the proceeds of disgorgement do not go 
17
money directly with the corporation and the corporation does not benefit directly from that 
profit.95 Thus, there is no direct unjust enrichment to disgorge.96
This is not to say that corporations never receive indirect benefits from undiscovered 
open-market fraud.97 Indeed, depending upon the type of fraud, the corporation might receive 
incidental tax benefits, lower costs of capital, protection from hostile takeovers, temporary 
business advantages, and increased publicity, while its employees may experience increased job 
security.98 In the short run, the corporation’s increased share price may provide the capital to 
enter new businesses and update capital assets.99 The agent committing fraud may temporarily 
benefit from higher firm share prices, job advancement, increased stock options, and increased 
prestige and reputation.100 Yet all of these purported benefits are speculative and nearly 
impossible to value.  Even assuming a court could value them, their value is probably a good 
deal less than losses of open-market purchasers.101 Consequently, if the corporation has to 
compensate class members for out-of-pocket losses, this compensation should purge it of any 
indirect benefits.  One court observed that misstatements seldom benefit the corporate issuer and 
that “chickens have a way of coming home to roost.”102 “When they do so in the form of 
securities class action plaintiffs, a corporation has hell (and usually a great deal of money) to 
pay.”103 In sum, even if the corporation received some incidental benefit from the initial 
undiscovered fraud, out-of-pocket damages will likely suffice.   
 
to the victims, the money should be paid into the United States Treasury.  S.E.C. v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d 170 
(2d Cir. 1997); Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 956 F. Supp. at 503. 
95 See Prichard, supra note 23, at 930-37. Prichard proposes that even though corporations do not receive 
any pecuniary benefit from the fraud, their agents may be motivated by fear, greed, and Pollyannaism. 
96 Indeed, one commentator suggested that investors and their attorneys are the ones unjustly enriched by 
the fraud, not the corporation.  Langevoort, supra note 21, at 651.  I would not go that far.  The corporation does 
receive some indirect benefits from the initial undiscovered fraud such as increased publicity, a higher share trading 
price, and, for the individuals who commit fraud, temporarily increased job security. 
97 In an auditor situation, Judge Posner noted that to assume that the corporation always benefits from the 
fraud ignores the distinction between “fraud on behalf of a corporation” and “fraud against it.”  Cenco Inc. v. 
Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1982).  Judge Posner elaborates on this distinction, noting that 
“[f]raud against the corporation usually hurts just the corporation; the stockholders are the principal if not only 
victims.”  Id. Defendants have attempted to employ this distinction in securities fraud cases by arguing that where 
the corporation received no benefit it should not be held liable.  This argument, however, has been rejected by at 
least one court.  See, e.g., In re Cylink Sec. Litig., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1087-88 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
98 See, e.g., Plevy v. Haggerty, 38 F. Supp. 2d 816, 833 (C.D. Cal. 1998); Coffee, supra note 4, at 29 
(“Typically, managers hide bad news because they fear loss of their jobs (either from a dismissal or a hostile 
takeover), and they overstate favorable developments or inflate earnings in order to maximize the value of their 
stock options and other equity compensation); Alexander, supra note 2, at 1498; Arlen & Carney, supra note 4, at 
702-03. 
99 These benefits could continue to provide increased revenues long after the litigation ends.  Yet, even if a 
court required a corporation to disgorge its unjust enrichment, Section 78bb(a)’s “actual damages” requirement may 
limit the extent to which one could speculate about the fruits of fraud. 
100 See, e.g., Plevy, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 833; Alexander, supra note 2, at 1498. 
101 Alexander, supra note 2, at 1498. 
102 In re Cylink Sec. Litig., 178 F. Supp. 2d at 1087-88. 
103 Id.  Ironically, the judge’s main concern was not whether corporations should be held vicariously liable 
for the acts of their agents when their agents do not act in concert with or for the benefit of the corporation.  Instead, 
the judge was troubled that “[t]aking the corporation out of the class action for want of allegations of corporate 
benefit might well endanger [corporate issuer and insurance proceeds as] sources of recovery.”  Id. 
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Even though Dura indicated that modern securities actions resemble common-law deceit 
and misrepresentation actions, when awarding damages, courts should not ignore either the 
absence of a contract or the other disparities between face-to-face and open market transactions.  
Common law permitted disgorgement and recovery of benefit-of-the-bargain damages based on 
contract law and unjust enrichment principles.  But these principles do not apply to open-market 
fraud because, apart from public offerings, the issuer is generally not the seller in a fraud-on-the-
market case.104 
II. NORMATIVE THEORIES SUPPORTING PRIVATE 10B-5 ACTIONS 
Compensating the plaintiff class for more than its out-of-pocket loss in, for example, the 
gold-platinum hypothetical, is problematic given the distinctions between common-law deceit 
and misrepresentation actions on the one hand and fraud-on-the-market actions on the other.105
But, if compensating investors for more than their out-of-pocket losses fostered the goals of 
private class action litigation, then proposing legislative and judicial reforms to facilitate 
recovery might be a worthwhile endeavor.  The corrective justice theory, upon which the idea of 
compensation is based, posits that injustice occurs when one party realizes a gain and the other a 
corresponding loss.106 Theoretically, the class action then corrects the injustice by depriving one 
party’s gain and restoring it to the parties with the loss.107 But, because corporations do not 
receive a direct gain from the agent’s fraud on the open market, it is implausible to contend that 
the principal function of the class action is to correct justice by restoring lost compensation to 
investors.108 
A. Compensation as a Theoretical Rationale for Private Class Actions 
 
104 Some commentators have gone further to argue that investors are not entitled to recover out-of-pocket 
losses.  See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 21, at 639.  Langevoort notes that a “full out-of-pocket compensation in 
open-market cases is systematically excessive and dysfunctional, and not a system that a rational investor 
considering the issue ex ante would want, much less demand.”  Id. at 646. 
105 See Coffee, Loss Causation After Dura: Something for Everyone, supra note 6, at 5 (“[C]ourts should 
interpret loss causation to require a net stock market decline in the security’s price in order to preclude what I 
termed ‘phantom losses.’  But the Court has not done that.  Indeed, it has even suggested that new forms of phantom 
losses may be recoverable.”). 
106 Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice in a Nutshell, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 349, 349, 350 (2002); Gary 
Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 
1823 (1997) (noting corrective justice’s concern for compensating victims). 
107 Weinrib, supra note 106, at 349.  Weinrib observes, “A correlatively structured remedy responds to and 
undoes an injustice only if that injustice is itself correlatively structured.  In bringing an action against the defendant, 
the plaintiff is asserting that the two are connected as doer and sufferer of the same injustice . . . . The law then 
rectifies this injustice by reversing its active and passive poles, so that the doer of injustice becomes the sufferer of 
the law’s remedy.”  Although this rationale readily applies to face-to-face transactions, it is problematic as applied to 
open market transactions for the same reasons that rescission and disgorgement are problematic.  In this sense, the 
securities fraud class action is likely more in line with the notion of distributive justice.  See id. at 351.  I would be 
remiss in failing to point out that a wide divide exists between corrective justice scholars on the one hand and 
utilitarian scholars on the other.  See Jefferey O’Connoll & Christopher J. Robinette, The Role of Compensation in 
Personal Injury Tort Law: A Response to the Opposite Concerns of Gary Schwartz and Patrick Atiyah, 32 CONN. L. 
REV. 137, 139 (1999). 
108 See Schwartz, supra note 106, at 1824 (“For the fundamental rule of vicarious liability, the deterrence 
rationale gets the job done in a way that corrective justice does not.”). 
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Perhaps ideally, the private securities class action would provide an efficient means for 
obtaining financial relief for the wronged investor.  Still, when the subject security’s value 
appreciates after fraud (generating a value higher than what the investor paid for the security), as 
in the gold-platinum hypothetical, the investor is already financially advantaged from owning the 
security.109 Even absent this windfall, statistics show that securities class-action settlements 
recover only a small amount of investor loss,110 and that approximately seventy-percent of 
financial institutions with claims in settled securities class actions do not even submit them.111 
One study estimated that institutional investors failed to collect approximately $1 billion a year 
from securities class-action settlements.112 Statistics indicating that institutional investors are 
indifferent to settlement funds weakens the corrective justice and compensation arguments in 
favor of private class actions, especially where investors experienced no net loss from bundled 
favorable and adverse information.113 
Despite this evidence, compensation is often thought of as a reason to permit fraud-on-
the-market actions by private plaintiffs.114 Therefore, this section analyzes theories that 
undermine the compensation argument and observes that: (1) Congress did not enact securities 
laws to provide investor insurance; (2) private securities class actions redistribute wealth 
between diversified shareholders and leave no one better off except the attorneys; and (3) 
 
109 Merritt Fox adopts the opposite view and thinks that the plaintiff has suffered a loss in some sense of the 
word.  He observes: 
 
Assuming that she does not sell before full market realization of the true 
situation, the defendant’s misstatement has made her worse off in an amount 
equal to its inflation of purchase price.  But for the misstatement, she would 
have paid exactly that much less for the share, yet her return over her period of 
ownership (however long, and from whatever mix of dividends, distributions 
and sales proceeds that she receives) would have been just as great. 
 
Fox, supra note 13, at 1553.  Oddly, the U.S. government also took the position that this constitutes a loss.  It 
indicated that a price decline “may not be a necessary condition for loss causation, however, because the inflation 
attributable to the fraud could be reduced or eliminated even if there were a net increase in price.”  Amicus Brief for 
the United States in Support of Petition for Cert. at 13, Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005), available 
at 2004 WL 1205204 (May 28, 2004).   
110 Investor losses continually exceed settlement values.  Ronald I. Miller, Todd Foster, & Elaine Buckberg, 
Recent Trends in Shareholder Class Action Litigation: Beyond the Mega-Settlements, is Stabilization Ahead?,
NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING 7 (April 2006) (on file with author). 
111 Investor Protection: A Review of Plaintiffs’ Attorney Abuses in Securities Litigation and Legislative 
Remedies: Hearing on H.R. 5491 Before the House Comm. on Financial Services and the Subcomm. On Capital 
Markets, Insurance, and Government, 109th Cong. 2d Sess. (June 28, 2006) (testimony of James D. Cox); James D. 
Cox & Randall Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of 
the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411 
(2005) [hereinafter Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers]; James D. Cox & Randall Thomas, Leaving Money 
on the Table: Do Institutional Investors Fail to File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 WASH. U.L. Q. 883 
(2002). 
112 Cox & Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers, supra note 111, at 412; A.C. Prichard, Who 
Cares?, 80 WASH. U. L. Q. 883, 883 (2002). 
113 On average, only approximately 28% of eligible institutional investors file claims in class action 
settlements.  Cox & Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers, supra note 111, at 424. 
114 Section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act contributes to this idea of compensation and courts readily 
assumed that damages developed for common-law fraud face-to-face transactions also applied to open-market 
transactions.  Langevoort, supra note 21, at 645. 
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compensating investors for their cognitive errors reduces incentives to learn and creates perverse 
incentives to hold on to stocks that hint at fraud.  Even though these observations apply to 
securities class actions as a whole, my focus here is that the class action’s principal goal should 
not be compensating investors when they suffered no out-of-pocket losses. 
(1) Securities Laws Were Not Enacted to Provide Investor Insurance  
Congress enacted the securities laws to promote integrity in the open market, not to 
provide investor insurance.115 In fact, the loss causation element precludes securities laws from 
becoming an insurance program for any security purchased in reliance on a misstatement – 
regardless of whether the misstatement caused a change in value – by ensuring that the misdeed 
actually caused the economic loss.116 
To be sure, failing to disclose material information that artificially inflates the security’s 
price harms the investor who purchases at that price and does not sell the security before the 
corporation discloses adverse information.  Nevertheless, investing in the stock market is an 
inherently risky business, and the corporate defendant cannot return the illicit profit because the 
seller – not the corporation – received it.  In short, stock market investments should not be 
treated as the equivalent of placing money in a risk-free federally insured savings and loan 
plan.117 This is not to say that fraud should become another investment risk.  Rather, when 
misstatements do not cause the loss or the market simply is not as strong as predicted, the class 
action should not function as a form of supplemental income.  To minimize risk, investors can 
insulate themselves from the effects of market downturns and fraud by diversifying their 
portfolios.118 Thus, as set forth below, compensating investors for company-specific losses may 
not be necessary. 
(2) Private Actions Redistribute Wealth between Diversified Shareholders 
 
It is often said that securities class actions are a zero sum game for diversified investors 
and I will not attempt to rehash that literature here.119 I will, however, note that class actions 
 
115 Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005) (“At the same time, allowing a plaintiff to forgo 
giving any indication of the economic loss and proximate cause that the plaintiff has in mind would bring about the 
harm of the very sort the statutes seek to avoid . . . . Such a rule would tend to transform a private securities action 
into a partial downside insurance policy.”); Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 252 (White, J., joined by 
O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995); Langevoort, 
supra note 41, at 181 (“[T]here is very little reason to use the class action device as what is essentially an insurance 
system against market mood swings.”).   
116 Carlton v. Franklin, 1990 WL 116788, at *3 (4th Cir. Aug. 2, 1990). 
117 See generally Brigden v. Scott, 456 F. Supp. 1048 (D.C. Tex. 1978) (likening plaintiffs who invested in 
speculative real estate investments, received tax write-offs and benefits from the deal, and wanted rescission to 
roulette players).  There have been a number of arguments that the gambling industry and securities industry should 
have similar regulation.  See, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, Disparate Regulatory Schemes for Parallel Activities: 
Securities Regulation, Derivatives Regulation, Gambling, and Insurance, 24 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 375, 395 
(2005). 
118 See generally Prichard, supra note 23, at 940-41 (“Holding a diversified portfolio effectively eliminates 
any possibility of being a net loser from fraud on the market, thereby assuaging the concerns of even the risk-averse 
shareholder.”). 
119 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 4, at 26; Langevoort, supra note 41, at 181 (“First, any award against the 
issuer or settlement is funded directly or indirectly out of the issuer shareholders’ pockets, as the fraud-on-the-
market litigation system is premised almost exclusively on a system of vicarious liability.  Second, investors tend to 
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cannot actually be a “zero sum” game when as much as thirty-percent of the recovery pays for 
litigation costs.120 To explain, in open-market class litigation, a group of shareholders and former 
shareholders who purchased the defendant corporation’s stock during the relevant “class period” 
sues the corporation for a misstatement or omission even though the corporation itself has not 
purchased or sold its securities.121 When the litigation settles (or a judgment is entered), the 
corporation and thus, indirectly, its shareholders, bear the costs.  Accordingly, securities class 
actions in the open market produce a wealth transfer between shareholders who own stock in the 
corporation and shareholders in the class.122
This is particularly true when an investor spreads the risk of loss by diversifying her 
portfolio, minimizing the impact of a poor financial showing by any one company.123 
Diversification increases the likelihood that an investor will be in both in the plaintiff-class suing 
the corporation and in the shareholder group paying for the litigation.124 The more an investor is 
diversified, the greater the likelihood that, on any given day, she will be a shareholder within the 
class period or in the group indirectly funding the settlement.  Consequently, even though 
investors “win” on some days and “lose” on others, in the aggregate, they are essentially 
transferring their wealth from one pocket to another.125 In sum, private securities class actions 
appear to be a costly means for diversified investors to make wealth transfers to themselves (and 
pay a substantial amount to their attorneys).126 
In fact, the primary beneficiaries of private securities-fraud class actions appear to be the 
attorneys.127 Transactional costs such as attorneys’ fees as well as settlement payments to 
 
be, directly or indirectly, diversified in their investments and are just as likely to gain a windfall from issuer ‘fraud-
on-the-market’ as to end up a loser.”); Douglas M. Schwab et al., A Completely New Approach to Rule 10b-5 
Damages, 1203 PLI/CORP. 347, 364-65 (2000); Prichard, supra note 23, at 938-39; Langevoort, supra note 21, at; 
Alexander, supra note 2, at 1502. 
120 Anjan V. Thakor et al., The Economic Reality of Securities Class Action Litigation, 3 (Oct. 26, 2005), 
available at http://www.navigantconsulting.com/A559B1/navigantnew.nsf/vGNCNTByDocKey/PP6C93BCE4133/ 
$FILE/NCI-TheEconomicRealityofSecuritiesClassActionLitigation_10.26.05_.pdf (last visited June 30, 2006) (on 
file with author). 
121 Coffee, supra note 4, at 26. 
122 Id. 
123 Id.; Prichard, supra note 23, at 940-41.    
124 Coffee, supra note 4, at 26.  For example, say an investor focuses on the pharmaceutical industry and 
compiles a diversified portfolio of stocks for the numerous companies within that industry.  If consumers avoid 
Merck’s painkiller, Vioxx, because of the ongoing class litigation, it does not mean that they will go without 
painkillers and cause a downturn in the entire pharmaceutical industry.  Rather, they will use a different painkiller.  
An investor with diversified stocks within the pharmaceutical industry will suffer loss from the decrease in Merck’s 
stock but a gain from the increase in sales from other companies’ painkillers.  Thus, there is no net loss.  
125 Coffee, supra note 4, at 26.  For each shareholder who bought the stock at an artificially inflated price 
due to fraud, another shareholder has sold.  Alexander, supra note 2, at 1496.  Thus, one particular buyer’s loss is 
offset by the seller’s gain.  If all investors are ignorant of the fraud and are diversified then there will be winners 
with windfalls just as often as there are losers.  Academics have continued to debate the effects of this circularity.  
See, e.g. Arlen & Carney, supra note 4, at 698-700; Paul Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in 
Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623, 635 (1992). 
126 Coffee, supra note 4, at 26; Arlen & Carney, supra note 4, at 700.  A number of academics have 
recognized the circularity of the private securities fraud class action among diversified investors.  See, e.g., 
Alexander, supra note 2, at 1498-99; Arlen & Carney, supra note 4, at 698-700; Mahoney, supra note 125, at 635. 
127 See Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: 
Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs, Defendants and Lawyers, 51 BUS. LAW. 1009, 
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investors frequently fall upon the corporation’s shareholders – often inequitably since the 
shareholders engaged in no wrongdoing.  Even the SEC recently indicated that it will consider 
whether the violative conduct victimized shareholders when determining whether to impose 
hefty financial penalties on the corporation.128 As Professor John Coffee argues, “[t]o punish the 
corporation and its shareholders in [a typical secondary open-market case] is much like seeking 
to deter burglary by imposing penalties on the victim for having suffered a burglary.”129 The 
result is a net social gain that, if measured only by investor trading gains and losses, is zero.130 
(3) Permitting Recovery beyond Out-of-Pocket Losses Reduces Incentives to Learn 
 
Securities class actions not only operate as a costly means for wealth redistribution, but 
may also have perverse incentives on investor motivation and education.131 Behavioral finance 
theorists present some tentative answers to market phenomenon left unexplained by traditional 
law and economics.132 They refute the assumption that investors are rational,133 yet it is not clear 
 
1013 (1996); Arlen & Carney, supra note 4, at 700; cf Jonathan R. Macey & Jeffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ 
Attorney’s Role in Class Actions and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform,
58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991) (observing that plaintiffs’ attorneys may have divergent interests from the interests of 
the class). 
128 Press Release, Securities Exchange Commission, Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm (last visited 
July 4, 2006).  The SEC observed: 
 
In cases in which shareholders are the principal victims of the violations, the 
Committee expects that the SEC, when appropriate, will seek penalties from the 
individual offenders acting for a corporate issuer. Moreover, in deciding whether 
and to what extent to assess a penalty against the issuer, the court may properly 
take into account whether civil penalties assessed against corporate issuers will 
ultimately be paid by shareholders who were themselves victimized by the 
violations. The court also may consider the extent to which the passage of time 
has resulted in shareholder turnover.  
 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
129 Coffee, supra note 4, at 5.   
130 Alexander, supra note 2, at 1496; Langevoort, supra note 21, at 646; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 
3, at 639. 
131 As Langevoort notes, “[f]ew rational investors would opt for a system that so systematically 
overcompensates when they know that investors generally will be funding those payments.  And no rational investor 
would opt for an expensive litigation system to accomplish it Langevoort, supra note 21, at 650. 
132 Langevoort, supra note 41, at 153 (“One of the contributions of the behavioral finance research is that it 
may help us explain otherwise puzzling marketplace behavior, even if it does not yield clear-cut answers on the 
appropriate response.”).  For background on the literature of behavioral finance, see SERSH SHEFRIN, BEYOND 
GREED AND FEAR: UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING, at Ch. 2 (2002);  
BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Governmental 
Regulation of Irrationality: Moral and Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620 (2006), available at 
http://www.law.umn.edu/uploads/images/3289/Mitchell__Klick_Final.pdf; Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Prichard, 
Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 14 (2003); Ronald L. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The 
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715 (2003); Langevoort, 
supra note 41, at 135; Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations Regarding 
Proposals for its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397 (2002); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998). 
133 Ribstein, supra note 6, at 138; Philip E. Tetlock & Barbara A. Mellers, The Great Rationality Debate,
13 PSYCHOL. SCI. 94 (2002).  Numerous works explicate the particular biases that investors might be subject to.  See 
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how these insights relate to securities regulation.134 As Larry Ribstein observed, if markets are 
not as efficient as once believed, then Congress may need to strengthen securities laws to provide 
additional insulation from investor misjudgment – i.e., the paternalistic view of behavioral 
economics.135 On the other hand, if “noise” moves markets instead of actual information, then 
increased regulation and liability may lead to more harm.136 Ribstein identifies one of the 
hazards related to class actions and notes that “[f]orcing corporations or insiders to pay damages 
linked to the market’s irrational response to disclosures may have perverse effects, including 
discouraging disclosure.”137 
But discouraging disclosure may be even less problematic than diminishing individual 
incentives to learn from past investment mishaps.  Jonathan Klick and Greg Mitchell’s recent 
research indicates that making the private class action available to defrauded investors even 
where the investors experienced no out-of-pocket loss could reduce both their incentive to learn 
and their ability to make future decisions.138 Klick and Mitchell argue that “moral hazards” 
appear when paternalistic regulations – such as securities laws – reduce individual incentives to 
act “deliberately and carefully.”139 Similarly, individuals face “cognitive hazards” when these 
regulations restrict choices that might otherwise function as learning opportunities.140 But moral 
and cognitive hazards do not exist solely in the vacuum of regulation.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ 
intervention into investors’ lives may also restrict learning opportunities. 
 
As we have seen, diversified investors, as corporate shareholders, fund a generous 
portion of securities-fraud settlements.141 Thus, few fully informed investors would choose 
expensive class litigation that essentially transfers wealth from one pocket to another.142 Yet, 
behavioral finance indicates that human rationality is bounded and that decision-makers must 
 
Choi & Prichard, supra note 132, at 7-15 (noting that the number of biases makes one wonder how investors are 
ever able to make a positive market return); Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and the 
Determinants of Confidence, 24 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 411 (1992) (overconfidence bias); Amos Tversky & Daniel 
Kahneman, Belief in the Law of Small Numbers, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 23-
24 (1982); Baruch Fischoff, Hindsight Is Not Equal to Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment 
Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288, 288 (1975) (hindsight 
bias). 
134 Ribstein, supra note 6, at 138; Langevoort, supra note 41, at 153 (“Lawyers and policy makers cannot 
hope to resolve the academic dispute over market efficiency reflected in the foregoing finance scholarship.”). 
135 Ribstein, supra note 6, at 138. 
136 Id.; see generally J. Bradford De Long et al., Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. POL. ECON.
703 (1990). 
137 Ribstein, supra note 6, at 138.  Ribstein further observes that holding corporate agents liable for 
misrepresentations may “increase investors’ tendency toward overconfidence by convincing them that securities 
trading is safe, even if liability merely protects them only from a relatively narrow risk of misrepresentation.”  Id. at 
144. 
138 See Klick & Mitchell, supra note 132, at 1626. 
139 Id.; see also Ribstein, supra note 6, at 145. 
140 Klick & Mitchell, supra note 132, at 1626, 1633.  Ribstein observes that the law may not have much 
effect on learning if investors do not know how it protects them and points out that investors who do learn may be 
replaced by a new naïve group.  Ribstein supra note 6, at 145.  Yet, this does not eliminate the potential perverse 
effects of class litigation on investor learning. 
141 Prichard, supra note 23, at 958 (“The transaction costs of litigation leading to settlements that merely 
transfer wealth among shareholders are a pure social waste, unless class actions provide a substantial deterrent 
effect.”); Mahoney, supra note 125, at 636; Arlen & Carney, supra note 4, at 699-700. 
142 See Langevoort, supra note 21, at 650. 
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select among numerous demands for their time and attention.143 Consequently, investors are 
“rationally ignorant,” possibly about the true litigation costs, because it is unreasonable, if not 
impossible, to gather all relevant information before making a single decision.144 Because the 
majority of non-attorney individuals do not have much information about the inner-workings of a 
securities-fraud class action, they are (a) likely to take their attorneys’ advice and proceed with a 
class action (and subsequent settlement) that they are inadvertently funding and (b) not likely to 
distinguish between recoveries that are out-of-pocket versus those based on contract law 
measurements, such as disgorgement or rescissory damages.145 Although legal education would 
likely diminish this ignorance,146 it is extraordinarily unlikely that an investor would squander the 
time, effort, and expense of a legal education just to determine whether a securities class action 
makes economic sense.   
 
Without a firm doctrinal statement on securities-fraud damages, the class action is 
arguably available to investors, such as those in the gold-platinum hypothetical, who did not 
experience a net loss.  Because individuals “learn by doing,”147 compensating investors without 
out-of-pocket losses not only prevents them from learning from their past investment mistakes 
but provides a perverse incentive to ignore potential warning signs of future fraud in hopes of 
receiving additional money in a class action.148 This, in turn, fosters rational ignorance and 
rewards the investor who stays aboard the metaphorical sinking ship when other investors 
heeded the warning signs long before.  In short, if private litigation compensates investors 
without out-of-pocket losses once, this could (1) prevent individuals from learning from their 
investment mistakes and reward ignorance and (2) provide a perverse incentive to purposefully 
invest in companies with signs of fraud with the hope that they will again receive a litigation 
windfall.149 
143 See ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 50-56 (1988); Prentice, supra note 
132, at 1454; Jolls et al., supra note 132, at 1471; Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the 
Environment, 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 129, 129 (1956). 
144 See Prentice, supra note 132, at 1454.  There have been a number of initiatives to make corporate 
disclosures less dense and more useful through simplification.  For example, before Congress passed the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, SEC Chairman Pitt urged public companies to “consider simplifying financial disclosures to make 
accounting statements useful to and utilizable by, ordinary investors.”  Harvey L. Pitt, Remarks Before the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Governing Counsel (Oct. 22, 2001), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch516.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2006). Making financial disclosures easier to 
read would certainly help in reducing the amount of information that investors might consider before investing.  Yet, 
even still, it would be difficult to read every company’s full disclosures before making a single investment decision. 
145 See generally Ribstein, supra note 6, at 141 (“[I]nvestors are not equal in education, intelligence, or 
expertise.”). 
146 Cf Klick & Mitchell, supra note 132, at 1652 (arguing that education affects an individual’s chances of 
picking the correct option). 
147 Id. at 1626 (“[R]esearch from developmental psychology indicates that individuals improve their 
decision-making skills over time through a ‘learning by doing’ process, and that paternalistic policies threaten 
interference in this self-regulatory process.”). 
148 Of course, this theory is not immune to the criticism that minimizing the incentive for private litigation 
in certain circumstances is paternalistic in and of itself.  Yet, a steadfast avoidance of all paternalistic initiatives 
leads to a return to laissez-faire markets. See generally id.  at 1653 (“Imposing no choice-set constraint or offering 
no insurance would represent a laissez-faire stance in which there is no paternalistic oversight of the biased 
behavior.”).  Recall the stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression that followed, which counsels against 
this approach to securities regulation.   
149 There might be an interesting if not persuasive defense here.  If individual or even institutional investors 
continually purchased securities that reeked of fraudulent behavior in hopes of obtaining a windfall recovery in a 
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This leaves open the question of whether laws or judicially tailored recoveries should 
“save investors from themselves.”  Of course, taking away the choice to sue where investors 
suffer no net loss can be seen as yet another paternalistic intervention.  Given that congressional 
members and judges also suffer from cognitive biases,150 the question that follows then is 
whether an optimal level of paternalism exists and, if so, who is the administrator?  This section 
raises more questions that it does answers, but Klick and Mitchell offer some preliminary 
observations on this point.  They contend that “optimal paternalism represents a mechanism 
design problem in which a social planner must consider using more than just the sledgehammer 
of constraining choice sets ex ante or providing implicit social insurance through some form of 
ex post paternalism.”151 Thus, if one considers the judiciary an apt social planner, then at least 
one option is to negate social insurance by limiting investors to out-of-pocket losses in private 
class actions.  The corollary is then that the class action is not available to net winners from 
fraud.  Although arguably paternalistic, this option promotes investors’ incentives to learn from 
their past investment errors and takes one opportunity for class litigation away – and with it the 
perverse double-reward when the net stock price increases after fraud.    
B. Private Class Actions Promote Deterrence 
 
Because compensating defrauded investors without out-of-pocket loss encourages costly 
wealth transfers between diversified investors and provides disincentives to learn, compensation 
should not be the principal rationale underlying securities fraud class actions.  Instead, in accord 
with Congress’s goal of ensuring market integrity, private litigation’s primary objective must be 
to deter fraud.152 The SEC commented that “the overriding purpose of Congress was not so much 
to impose liability for the benefit of investors injured by a defective registration statement but 
 
securities class action, the defendants could argue that the plaintiffs did not rely on the misrepresentation.  Lack of 
reliance has been a traditional defense in face-to-face transactions where reliance is unreasonable.  See, e.g., Royal 
Am. Managers, Inc. v. IRC Holding Corp., 885 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1989).  To make this argument in an open-market 
case, the defendants would have to challenge the efficient market hypothesis, which is made easier by the large body 
of literature on behavioral finance and noise traders.  See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 6, at 138; Lynn A. Stout, The 
Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635 (2003); J. Bradford De 
Long et al., Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. POL. ECON. 703, 713 (1990). 
150 See Charistopher R. Drahozal, A Behavioral Analysis of Private Judging, 67-SPG LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 105 (2004); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Symposium, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW.
U. L. REV. 1165, 1199-1201 (2003); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Symposium, Structuring Lawmaking 
to Reduce Cognitive Bias: A Critical View, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 616, 630-31 (2002). 
151 Klick & Mitchell, supra note 132, at 1653. 
152 See Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 664 (1986); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 
U.S. 128, 151 (1972); Mahoney, supra note 125, at 636 (“Note that a redistribution among shareholders that does 
not enhance deterrence is every bit as bad as fraud itself.  Just as fraud may lead to investments in lying and 
precautions so the possibility of using litigation as purely a redistributive tool will lead to excessive investment in 
litigation.”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 
VA. L. REV. 669, 693-94 (1984). The courts and the SEC generally interpret securities laws to maximize deterrence. 
See Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. at 664; Affiliated Ute Citizens, 406 U.S. at 151 (“Congress intended securities 
legislation enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds to be construed ‘not technically and restrictively, but flexibly 
to effectuate its remedial purposes.”). 
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rather to stimulate diligence on the part of those persons who are actually responsible for [its] 
preparation.”153
Certainly, securities regulators want to deter the prospective practice of bundling adverse 
and favorable information to prevent a stock price drop and thus potentially prevent class action 
liability.  And compensatory damages can, in certain circumstances, promote deterrence by 
compelling officers and directors to internalize the costs and benefits of their actions.154 But, 
since class recovery redistributes wealth between diversified shareholders and could cause 
perverse effects on investor education and motivation, perhaps the class action is not the best 
vehicle for deterring this type of bundling.155 One problem with using the class action to deter 
this practice is that its uncertain damage measures may not accurately pair penalties with the 
wrongful conduct’s social harm.156 Without a firm statement on how to measure potential 
damages, both attorneys and corporate actors lack a defined starting point for calculating 
financial costs.157 Thus, corporate actors have no gauge by which to judge detrimental effects of, 
for example, overly optimistic announcements.  Presumably, if this measurement is known, the 
wealth-maximizing actor will avoid conduct that results in costly financial penalties and society 
then benefits from accurate corporate information.158 
Given the uncertainty of potential class action damages, how do corporate actors weigh 
their behavior?   
 
153 Brief for SEC as Intervenor, at 9-10 Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 
(E.D.N.Y. 1971). 
154 See generally STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 5-21, 127-50 (1987); Robert 
Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523 (1984). 
155 See infra Part III.C. 
156 See generally Alexander, supra note 2, at 1493.  This is not to say that uncertainty about how to measure 
damages is the only problem.  Market reaction is also unpredictable.  But, a firm damage measure at least provides a 
predictable starting point.  Many commentators have explored ways in which the tort system does not lead to 
optimal deterrence because of the transactional costs of litigation and the disparity between social and private 
incentives.  See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman & Mark Geistfeld, The Divergence Between Social and Private 
Incentives to Sue: A Comment on Shavell, Menell, and Kaplow, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 483 (1987); Steven Shavell, The 
Social Verses the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 333 (1982). 
The deterrence theory is founded in the assumption that the officer or director is a rational actor and will 
change her behavior based on the costs and benefits of a situation.  Kevin M. Carlsmith, John M. Darley, & Paul H. 
Robinson, Why Do We Punish?  Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY &
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 284, 285 (2002).  Academics writing in the field of behavioral law and economics readily 
dispute the theory that humans are rational.  See, e.g., Choi & Prichard, supra note 132, at 1; James A. Fanto, Quasi-
Rationality in Action: A Study of Psychological Factors in Merger Decision-Making, 62 OHIO ST. L. J. 1333, 1343 
(2001); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 778 (2001). 
157 I take for granted that corporate actors aim to maximize wealth.  Of course, corporate actors may be 
motivated by other factors such as saving their jobs or covering previous wrongdoing.  Yet, corporations generally 
hire managers to promote the corporation, to act in its best interests, and to make the corporation profitable.  Thus, I 
assume, perhaps naively, that managers generally want to act in their own best interests, which would include 
keeping their jobs.  Consequently, because part of their job is to maximize corporate profits, they must perform this 
task to act in their own self-interest. 
158 Alexander, supra note 2, at 1493.  Note that this assumes that corporate actors aim to maximize wealth.  
This is not to say that corporate actors are not motivated by other factors.  Indeed, corporate managers may be trying 
to save their jobs or cover previous wrongdoing.  But because managers are generally hired for their ability to 
promote the corporation, I assume – perhaps naively – that managers generally want to act in the best interests of the 
corporation so that, if nothing else, they can at least hold on to their jobs.   
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(1) Maximizing Deterrence 
 
Until would-be-violators can estimate how much a penalty might cost, they will be 
unable to adjust their behavior accordingly.159 Put another way, if a would-be-violator feels that 
she could face exorbitant penalties regardless of her actions – a quasi-form of strict liability – 
then she may ignore potential penalties and engage in wealth-maximizing behavior.160 She may 
then hope that the penalty costs less than the wealth received from that particular behavior.161 
Wealth-driven corporate managers who contemplate violating the law must know the costs and 
the benefits before they can determine whether the benefits outweigh the expected liability.162 
But most private securities class actions end in confidential settlement agreements.  Even those 
that reach a judge or jury are subject to variable damages measures.163
Although most cases never reach a jury, if attorneys could advise would-be-violators and 
would-be-litigants on the legal rule for awarding class damages, the rule could at least provide a 
starting point for both groups to modify their behavior.  Or, perhaps initially more likely, they 
could agree upon a more realistic settlement value.  John Calfee and Richard Craswell identified 
“difficulty measuring damages” as among several pertinent factors that thwart optimal deterrence 
in tort law.164 Calfee and Craswell discuss the fallacy that excessive damage awards incentivize 
 
159 Erick Gerding explains the deterrence model from economic perspective as follows: 
 
Were an economist to model the deterrence theory that undergirds the antifraud 
rules of the securities law, the decision by a securities issuer or a market 
intermediary (such as a gatekeeper) on whether to commit fraud would look 
something like B < > Pd *((Pe * Ll) + Lr), where B represents the benefits to be 
realized from committing fraud, Pd represents the probability of the fraud being 
detected, Pe represents the probability of the securities laws being successfully 
enforced, Ll represents legal liability under the securities laws, and Lr represents 
market, reputational and other non-legal losses. 
Rational actors contemplating violating the law will do so if the 
benefits, B, outweigh the expected liability.  
 
Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. 
REV. 393, 427-28 (2006). 
160 Cf Prichard, supra note 23, at 959 (“The cost of litigating securities class actions, tied to potentially 
enormous judgments, ensures that even weak cases will produce a settlement if they are not dismissed before trial.”). 
161 See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal 
Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 966 (1984) (“If the legal standard is uncertain, even actors who behave ‘optimally’ 
in terms of overall social welfare will face some chance of being held liable because of the unpredictability of the 
legal rule.”). 
162 See Gerding, supra note 159, at 428.  A.C. Prichard identifies some of the costs of corporate fraud as 
reduced managerial accountability, higher cost of liquidity for traders, and capital allocation – by allowing firms to 
raise funds for noncost-justified investment projects.  Prichard, supra note 23, at 937-45. 
163 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 3, at 612 (quoting Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1121 (10th 
Cir. 1982)). 
164 Calfee & Craswell, supra note 161, at 969.  These factors included uncertainty about whether would-be-
violators will be sued, and if so, uncertainty about the size of the damages or fine that they would have to pay if 
found liable.  Id. Of course, even eliminating the uncertainty about whether there will be enforcement and the 
amount of damages does not eliminate all uncertainty.  One of the primary fallacies of securities law is the concept 
of materiality.  Given the myriad judicial approaches to materiality, an officer or director of a corporation may not 
know whether her comment or report will be considered “material.”  See generally Gerding, supra note 159, at 438-
40; Alexander, supra note 2, at 1494 (“For example, a corporation will have difficulty weighing the costs and 
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over-compliance with the law and, conversely, that insufficient awards prompt under-
compliance.165 Instead, uncertainty about the measure and level of damages can produce both 
under and over compliance (and under and over deterrence).166 To be sure, this is less than 
idyllic when social planners aim for optimal deterrence and optimal paternalism. 
(2) Preventing Substantive “Absolute” Liability and Promoting Predictability  
 
The Dura Court’s dicta increased unpredictability in measuring damages by intimating 
that a corporation might be liable in a class action when its higher share price is lower than it 
would have been absent fraud.  Unpredictability is evidenced by the increased likelihood that a 
corporation may find itself in the midst of a securities class action at some point – perhaps 
regardless of its precautions.167 In 2006, NERA Economic Consulting reported that over a five-
year period, the average public company has a ten-percent probability that it will face at least one 
shareholder class-action lawsuit.168 Although there is a forty-percent chance that the court will 
dismiss the action,169 the mere filing of the suit typically causes a drop in a company’s stock 
price.170 
Because it often takes months to achieve a final dismissal with prejudice, the corporation 
must report the litigation in its public SEC filings, which may decrease the willingness of new 
investors to purchase its securities.  As is oft mentioned in the ever-popular class action critique, 
getting rid of even frivolous litigation is not free, particularly when the court is unable to 
determine (due in part to the variable damage calculations) from the face of pleadings whether 
the suit satisfies the pleading standards.171 If the complaint might eventually plead a prima facie 
 
benefits of failing to disclose information if it is unsure about whether a court would consider that information 
‘material.’”). 
165 Calfee & Craswell, supra note 161, at 986. 
166 Id. Several briefs in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005), identified the 
problem of over-deterrence in fraud-on-the-market situations.  Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States 
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005), 
available at 2004 WL 2069560, at *10; Brief of Washington Legal Found as Amicus Curiae in Supp. of Petitioners, 
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005), available at 2004 WL 2069563, at *27.  The 
Supreme Court echoed this problem in its opinion by relying on the PSLRA and observing that the Act “makes clear 
Congress’ intent to permit private securities fraud actions for recovery where, but only where, plaintiffs adequately 
allege and prove the traditional elements of causation and loss.”  544 U.S. at 346. 
167 A.C. Prichard observes that if plaintiffs survive a motion to dismiss, then defendants usually settle 
because it is cheaper than litigation.  Prichard, supra note 23, at 952.  I would extend this period beyond the motion 
to dismiss stage and to the class certification stage.  Defendants are generally willing to prolong the litigation if they 
have a decent argument that the plaintiffs’ cannot meet the certification standards for Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23.  Consequently, they will generally wait to settle until after the court certifies a class. 
168 Miller et al., supra note 110, at 3. 
169 Id. 
170 Coffee, supra note 4, at 5; Arlen & Carney, supra note 4, at 699 (“Revelation of the fraud, and of the 
corporation’s prospective liability has an immediate impact on the price of the issuing corporations stock:  the price 
adjusts to reflect both the truth previously concealed by the fraud and the corporation’s expected liability for the 
fraud.”). 
171 The Supreme Court observed in Dura that even though a plaintiff need only provide “a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” “it should not prove burdensome for a plaintiff 
who has suffered an economic loss to provide a defendant with some indication of the loss and the causal connection 
that the plaintiff has in mind.”  Dura, 544 U.S. at 346.  Accordingly, it is not far-fetched to think that the Supreme 
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case of fraud, the result is usually a dismissal without prejudice so that the plaintiffs can, if 
possible, correct the deficiency.  This invariably leads to amendments and re-filing, which starts 
the cycle all over again.  Clarifying that plaintiffs are entitled to recovery only their out-of-
pocket losses could facilitate earlier dismissal of actions without net loss.  
 
For now, the upshot of corporations experiencing at least a ten-percent probability of a 
securities class action means that the officers and directors must plan for such an occurrence.172 
The result is not overly cautious and pessimistic statements (for corporate agents would not last 
long by failing to appropriately promote the corporation), but rather is a budgetary allocation for 
officer and director insurance as well as for class-action litigation.  When the judicial system 
effectively holds defendants unconditionally liable by prompting them to build securities class 
actions into their budget – regardless of whether they have committed fraud – then defendants 
have little incentive to take excessive precautionary measures.  If the funds (or the Directors and 
Officers Insurance policies)173 are already available, what incentive does management have to be 
more realistic in its financial reports?174 Though volatile market reactions generate a great deal 
of uncertainty as well, a clear damage rule could facilitate earlier dismissal of suits without net 
losses and give corporate planners at least some degree of predictability in calculating their 
conduct in financial terms.175 
III. LIMITING PRIVATE CLASS RECOVERY TO NET LOSSES 
As espoused throughout this Article, one option for a doctrinal statement on damages in 
the open market is to restrict plaintiffs’ recovery to out-of-pocket losses.  This would provide 
compensation only for net monetary losses.176 Although it seems relatively simple, this rule has 
broader practical and theoretical ramifications.  First, unlike other common-law remedies, the 
out-of-pocket rule compensates plaintiffs only for the loss caused by the fraud and therefore 
aligns with the stringent loss causation requirements and the limitation on “actual damages” in 
28 U.S.C. Section 78bb(a).177 Second, it supplies a predictable foundation for judging the 
reliability of expert methodology that purports to prove economic loss and injury.178 Third, 
limiting plaintiffs to their out-of-pocket losses facilitates earlier dismissal of suits that provide 
 
Court would encourage dismissal of claims that fail to demonstrate economic loss.  The variable, of course, is how 
that loss is measured. 
172 See Coffee, supra note 4, at 17. 
173 See id. at 19; Prichard, supra note 23, at 925 (“Directors’ and officers’ (“D&O) insurance pays a portion 
of settlements and the corporation pays the remainder.  Newer D&O policies reflect the company’s exposure by 
providing coverage to the company as well as its officers.  D&O insurance pays for settlements because a refusal to 
pay could expose the insurer to potential liability for bad faith refusal to settle.”); Alexander, supra note 2, at 1497; 
supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
174 Granted, if the managers use their budgetary allocation for securities class action litigation then they will 
have to replenish it so they do have some incentive to avoid fraud and prevent corporate loss.  Yet, managers 
without this sort of budgetary requirement at all might have greater incentives to avoid fraud. 
175 I recognize that limiting plaintiffs to out-of-pocket losses decreases the class action’s deterrence value as 
applied to a corporation that attempts to avoid liability by bundling favorable and adverse information.  There are, 
however, other adequate means for deterring that situation.  See infra Part III.C. 
176 This complies with Dura’s requirement that “a plaintiff . . . show not only that had he known the truth 
he would not have acted but also that he suffered actual economic loss.”  Dura, 544 U.S. at 343. 
177 See infra Part III.A.1 and Part III.A.2. 
178 See infra Part III.A.3. 
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double-recoveries to investors and that create an incentive to invest purposefully in companies 
showing signs of fraud.179 Finally, this limit could bolster the class action’s deterrence value 
through increased predictability.180
A. Out-of-Pocket Losses Provide the Best Fit for Modern Securities Fraud 
 
Restricting the plaintiff class’s recovery to its out-of-pocket loss recognizes that open-
market fraud is a tort and that the company is being held vicariously liable.  Despite the 
similarity of certain pleading requirements for both common law deceit and open-market fraud, 
open-market securities fraud class actions differ factually in significant ways.  In open market 
transactions, there is typically no contract between the corporation and its public shareholders, 
there is no privity between the nonissuing corporate defendant and the plaintiffs, and the 
corporation does not receive a direct benefit from the fraud.181 Unlike other remedies that are 
contract and equity-based, the out-of-pocket measure resonates with the realities of open-market 
fraud.   
(1) Out-of-Pocket Recoveries Comply with the Loss Causation Standard 
 
The out-of-pocket measure also supports Dura’s strengthened loss causation requirement.  
Despite its relative ambiguity, loss causation plainly mandates that plaintiffs tie the loss for 
which they seek damages to the defendant’s misrepresentation or omission.182 It follows that, if 
liable, defendants should compensate plaintiffs only for those losses.  Consequently, a typical 
rescissory measure of loss, which aims to restore the parties to the position they would have been 
in absent the fraud, should not be available since it would require the defendant to reimburse the 
plaintiff for losses caused by fraud and for losses caused by changes in the market.183 
In the same manner, loss causation prevents unjust enrichment damages.  In the gold-
platinum hypothetical, the corporation’s stock price increased after the disclosure of no gold and 
the announced discovery of platinum.  Thus, the corporation arguably received an indirect 
benefit from the platinum discovery.184 But the platinum discovery cannot enter the damage 
equation because the defendant’s indirect profit from that discovery is unconnected to the 
plaintiffs’ gold-related losses.  Apart from a possible attempt to avoid liability by bundling 
adverse and favorable news, there is no link between the stock price increase based on the 
platinum discovery and the alleged decrease from the absence of gold.  In other words, there can 
be a lack of gold without the addition of platinum.  A plaintiff is entitled to reimbursement only 
 
179 See supra Part II.A.1. 
180 See supra Part II.B.2.  To be sure, it inhibits the class action’s ability to deter corporations from 
bundling favorable and adverse information to avoid class action liability.  But the SEC, Department of Justice, and 
exchanges can still deter that type of behavior.  See infra Part III.C. 
181 See supra page 17 (discussing the indirect benefits that corporations may receive from undiscovered 
fraud). 
182 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4). 
183 See Thompson, supra note 18, at 1180 n. 12.  Note, however, that the defendant would only be 
responsible for ninety days worth of changes since Congress had determined that this particular point in time is the 
appropriate period for market adjustment.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e)(2) (2006). 
184 See supra page 17 (discussing the indirect benefits that a corporation might receive from undiscovered 
fraud) 
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for loss caused by the misrepresentation or omission.185 Disgorgement is not an appropriate 
remedy for that loss because disgorgement purges indirect benefits obtained by the corporation; 
it does not award damages based on the loss caused by the misdeed.186 Moreover, where the 
defendant would have obtained the benefit even without the fraud, disgorgement is not 
appropriate.187 In short, even though Dura suggested that a plaintiff might bring an action when 
a share’s higher price is lower than it would have been absent the fraud, a court should not 
require the corporation to purge itself of any indirect benefits it obtained from its unrelated 
positive news.188
(2) Out-of-Pocket Losses Conform with 28 U.S.C. § 78bb(a)’s “Actual  Damages” Limit  
 
Restricting plaintiffs to out-of-pocket recoveries also aligns with Section 78bb(a)’s 
“actual damages” cap.189 This section’s language limits plaintiffs’ to “actual damages” caused by 
the misdeed.190 Most courts construe this term to mean some form of economic loss and limit 
awards to those that are strictly compensatory in nature.191 Accordingly, “actual damages” would 
not include speculative lost profits from benefit-of-the-bargain or expectation damages.192 
Some courts have, however, assessed rescissory damages even under the “actual 
damages” theory by reasoning that this award must be “reduced by any value received as a result 
of the fraudulent transaction.”193 The Supreme Court, in Randall v. Loftsgaarden, assumed, 
because neither party challenged it, that rescissory recoveries could sometimes be proper for a 
section 10(b) case.194 It thought that “in some circumstances” there was authority allowing the 
section 10(b) plaintiff to choose between “undoing the bargain” or “holding the defendant to the 
 
185 Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1447 n. 5 (11th Cir. 1997). 
186 Although, as I discussed above, the corporation may receive indirect benefits from the fraud.  Yet, these 
benefits are quite speculative and their value is probably a good bit less than losses of open-market purchasers 
during that class period.  Alexander, supra note 2, at 1498.  Consequently, if the corporation has to compensate 
investors for out-of-pocket losses, this should more than suffice to purge any indirect benefit. 
187 Thompson, supra note 63, at 386-87. 
188 See infra page 17 (discussing the indirect benefits that a corporation may receive from fraud but 
concluding that these benefits do not exceed a potential out-of-pocket recovery).  Perhaps it is the attorneys that are 
unjustly enriched?  For an article suggesting the truth of this statement, see Langevoort, supra note 21, at 651.   
189 28 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2006).  See, e.g., Pelletier v. Stuart-James Co., Inc, 863 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 
1989); Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 787 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1986); Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 
1974); Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1971); Estate Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1962).  Not all courts have read the term “actual damages” to exclude 
benefit-of-the-bargain damages.  See, e.g., See, e.g., Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1981); John R. Lewis, 
Inc. v. Newman, 446 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1971). 
190 This section states that “no person . . . shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one or more 
actions, a total amount in excess of his actual damages on account of the act complained of.”  28 U.S.C. § 77bb(a); 
see also In re Control Data Corp. Sec. Litig., 933 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1991). Some courts dispute that section 78bb 
contains a limit and contend, “there cannot be any one rule of damages prescribed which will apply in all cases, even 
where it is conceded that the finding must be limited to actual damages.” Osofsky, 645 F.2d at 111. 
191 Pelletier v. Stuart-James Co., Inc, 863 F.2d 1550, 1557-58 (11th Cir. 1989); Jones v. Miles, 656 F.2d 
103, 107 n. 8 (5th Cir. 1981). 
192 Pelletier, 863 F.2d at 1557-58 (citing Wolf v. Frank, 477 F.2d 467, 478 (5th Cir. 1972)); Harris v. Am. 
Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1975); Sound Video Unlimited, Inc. v.  Video Shack, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 127 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).  
193 Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168 (8th Cir. 1982). 
194 478 U.S. 647, 661-62 (1986).   
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bargain by requiring him to pay [out-of-pocket] damages.”195 Yet, Loftsgaarden is 
distinguishable for our purposes: it concerned a situation where privity of contract existed and 
did not address an open-market context.   
 
After the Court’s Dura decision, if presented with the issue of whether rescissory 
damages are appropriate to remedy open-market fraud, the Court would likely decide that 
defendants must reimburse plaintiffs only for economic losses actually caused by the misdeed.  
This would effectually bar rescissory damages that compensate plaintiffs for non-fraud related 
losses.  Even if the “actual damages” language does not preclude rescissory damages, it seems 
that loss causation, which requires a causal connection between the loss and the 
misrepresentation or omission, would.196 Accordingly, the loss causation element and the “actual 
damages” restriction confine litigants to recovery for their out-of-pocket losses. 
(3) Proving Hypothetical Damages 
 
Even though proving damages is never a simple endeavor, the out-of-pocket rule may 
require less speculation than other measures.  For any defrauded purchaser to recover, she must 
establish the difference between the value of what she actually received and the value of what 
she would have received absent the misrepresentation.197 In the gold-platinum situation, because 
the stock price never actually declined, any damage calculation would have to be based on 
speculation.198 Granted, assessing damages in that hypothetical would be somewhat easier 
because both gold and platinum have a fixed market value.  But this exercise becomes 
increasingly difficult without fixed values.  Any attempt to measure damages must isolate the 
value of the misrepresentation (or omission) – i.e., the gold discovery – and remove from 
consideration both the platinum announcement and any added value that could accrue from the 
gold-platinum combination. 
 
195 Id. at 662 (internal citations omitted). 
196 See supra Part II.A. 
197 This value cannot include damages covering “the expected fruits of an unrealized speculation.”  Sigafus 
v. Porter, 179 U.S. 116, 125 (1900).  The Supreme Court adopted this fundamental rule as the basic measure of 
damages under 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); see 
also Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc., 559 F.2d 1357 (8th Cir. 1977); Foster v. Fin. Tech., Inc., 517 F.2d 1068 
(9th Cir. 1975); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1974); Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233 
(7th Cir. 1974); Wolf v. Frank, 477 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1973); Levine v. Selion, Inc. 439 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1971); 
Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1971); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F. 2d 781 (1st Cir. 1965).  As one 
commentator observed, the out-of-pocket rule “allows recovery of the difference between the actual value of what 
the injured party gave and what he received.”  Harris v. Am. Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 225 (8th Cir. 1975) (quoting 
Note, Measurement of Damages in Private Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 1968 WASH. U. L. Q. 165, 172 (1968); see 
also W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 110, at 733-34 (1971). 
198 John Coffee has termed this general type of loss “phantom losses.”  He observed that “to permit 
recovery in this case hypothesized by the Court [in Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo], is to permit recovery based 
on a double speculation – first, as to the original uncorroborated price inflation and, second, as to what would have 
been the later price increase in the absence of discovery of the original inflation.”  Coffee, Loss Causation After 
Dura: Something for Everyone, supra note 6, at 5. 
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Given the speculative nature of claims where no price decline occurs after a corporation 
discloses a misrepresentation,199 the plaintiff class should put forth sufficient evidence of out-of-
pocket loss in the complaint to survive a motion to dismiss.200 Expert testimony on class losses 
would likely become a vital part of establishing plaintiffs’ prima facie case.201 But, even once a 
court establishes that only out-of-pocket losses are compensable, there is no single universally 
accepted expert model for proving these losses.202 
The most typical model is the event study, which uses an expert to construct a “value 
line” that theoretically represents the stock’s “true value” if purchasers knew the undisclosed 
information on each day of the class period.  Then, in theory, the expert can assess individual 
loss for each class member by comparing the price actually paid with the value line construct.203 
Because investors often buy and sell shares within the class period, the methodology for 
assessing loss should account for in-and-out traders and provide a mechanism to net their 
windfalls against their losses to determine net loss.204 
199 Claims where the stock price did not actually decline are speculative because the lack of a decline could 
mean that the market did not consider the information material.  Consequently, plaintiffs would not be able to prove 
that they relied on a “material misrepresentation,” and could not plead a prima facie case of securities fraud. 
200 See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005); see also In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 
1006 (9th Cir. 2005); cf Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S.Ct. 1991, 2002 (2006) (“Certainly the plaintiff in 
this case, as in all tort cases involving damage to business, must demonstrate that he suffered a harm caused by the 
tort and not merely by external market conditions.”).  To state a claim for cases involving publicly traded securities, 
a plaintiff must allege the following elements: (1) a material misrepresentation; (2) scienter; (3) a connection with 
the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance; (5) economic loss; (6) loss causation.  Dura, 544 U.S. at 342 
(emphasis added). 
201 See generally RMED Int’l, Inc. v. Sloan’s Supermarkets, Inc., 2000 WL 310352 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 
2000) (permitting expert testimony to help establish damages at trial); In re Gaming Lottery, 2000 WL 193125 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2000) (permitting expert evidence as to damages by a Professor of Finance). 
202 See In re Broadcom Corp. Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 1403756, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2005) (concluding 
that the PSLRA “leaves it open for a court to select the most reliable method of damages proof that is available in 
the particular case”); John Finnerty & George Pushner, An Improved Two-Trader Model for Measuring Damages in 
Securities Fraud Class Actions, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 213, 215 (2003). 
203 Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter?: A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 
STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1490-92 (1997).  Janet Alexander explains the process in two-steps: 
 
The first step is to determine the “per-share damages,” the amount of the actual 
market price attributable to the nondisclosure on each day of the class period.  
The second step is to determine the aggregate damages of the class.  To 
determine per-share damages, an expert economic witness constructs a “value 
line” which represents the “true value” of the stock – what purchasers would 
have been willing to pay if they had known the undisclosed information – on 
each day of the class period.  The damages sustained by any particular member 
of the class can then, in theory, be determined by comparing the price actually 
paid with the value line for the date of the transaction. 
 
Id. at 1491.   
204 There are several proposals for damage models that take this into account.  E.g., Janet Cooper 
Alexander, The Value of Bad News in Securities Class Actions, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1421, 1458-62 (1994) Jon 
Koslow, Note, Estimating Aggregate Damages in Class-Action Litigation Under Rule 10b-5 for Purposes of 
Settlement, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 811, 831-34 (1991).  Given that the appropriate model may vary based upon the 
facts of the case, this article does not promote a particular model.  Instead, given the loss causation requirement, it 
recommends that any appropriate model should account for in-and-out traders and provide a mechanism to net their 
windfalls against their losses.  For an overview of some of the different types of models, see Robert A. Alessi, The 
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Despite widespread use of the event study to demonstrate market reaction, the study can 
show only that the market reacted to the disclosure; it cannot prove why.205 Even experts relying 
on the same data and facts often present competing inferences regarding the amount of harm.206 
Add to this an extended period between the misrepresentation and the disclosure – as was the 
case in Dura207 – and there is an increased potential for non-related events to affect the market 
price.208 Loss causation requires plaintiffs to demonstrate a causal connection between the 
misrepresentation (or omission) and the economic loss.209 Assuming liability, it follows that 
defendants have to compensate plaintiffs only for economic losses caused by the fraud.  
Accordingly, courts must take precautions to ensure that experts’ methods extract non-related 
factors affecting price from their calculation.210 
Emerging Judicial Hostility to the Typical Damages Model Employed by Plaintiffs in Securities Class Action 
Lawsuits, 56 BUS. LAW. 483 (2001). Alessi observes that the Proportional Decay Model does not account for in-and-
out purchasers and has thus been subject to Daubert scrutiny.  Id. at 489-90. 
Daniel Fischel and David Ross’s research provides some indicia of how important it is to take in-and-out 
purchasers into account when calculating damages.  In one particular case, hey observed that “many of these 
institutions were ‘out-and-in’ during 1990: these institutions sold approximately 14 million shares [23% of the 60 
million shares] during the year prior to their purchases of shares that they held until year-end.  Thus, only 77% of the 
retained shares were retained by shareholders who were not out-and-in.”  Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, The 
Use of Trading Models to Estimate Aggregate Damages in Securities Fraud Litigation: A Proposal for Change, in 
SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS: ABUSES AND REMEDIES 135, 138 (National Legal Center for the Public Interest 1994). 
205 Ribstein, supra note 6, at 157 (“An event study might show that the market reacted to the corrective 
disclosure, but it cannot show why.”); Langevoort, supra note 41, at 177 (“Event study methodology can still be 
utilized to test for whether or when adjustment has occurred—i.e., abnormal returns disappear—over substantial 
periods of time.”).  Event studies generally start by identifying the change in price on the date of the disclosure and 
then use a regression analysis to eliminate market changes that are not caused by the fraud.  The study then works 
backwards to establish a hypothetical price for each day.  RONALD J. GILSON & BERNATRD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND 
FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, 185-228 (1995); Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in 
Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 BUS. LAW. 1, 17-19 (1982). 
206 Ribstein, supra note 6, at 157; Alexander, supra note 204, at 1421; Kenneth Cone & James Laurence, 
How Accurate are Estimates of Aggregate Damages in Securities Fraud Cases?, 49 BUS. LAW. 505 (1994). 
207 Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342-43 (2005). 
208 Langevoort, supra note 41, at 177-78. 
209 Dura, 544 U.S. at 342. 
210 The primary means for ensuring that experts isolate damages caused by fraud is the Daubert analysis.  
Whenever plaintiffs use experts to demonstrate injury and economic loss, courts should test the method using the 
Daubert factors. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 
U.S. 579 (1993). For additional information on how courts conduct the Daubert analysis, see L. Elizabeth 
Chamblee, Comment, Between “Merit Inquiry” and “Rigorous Analysis”: Using Daubert to Navigate the Gray 
Areas of Federal Class Action Certification, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1041, 1051-54 (2004). If plaintiffs use expert 
evidence to counter a motion to dismiss alleging that they either lack standing or failed to state a claim because they 
suffered no economic loss, then the court should conduct a Daubert test (even at this early stage) to probe the 
expert’s methodology and validity. A motion opposing class certification or a motion for summary judgment may 
also present this issue.  Issues of standing or failure to state a claim for lack of economic damages might appear in a 
motion opposing class certification in the form of a challenge to the adequacy of the representative under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23.  As I have argued elsewhere, courts should use Daubert earlier in the litigation process 
to help determine whether plaintiffs have plead their prima facie case.  Chamblee, supra, at 1041. The monetary 
amount may, because of various court rulings, change throughout the course of litigation.  But the expert’s method 
and plaintiffs’ complaint should demonstrate that, if true, that plaintiffs suffered an economic injury.  The court 
should then dismiss the action if (1) plaintiffs’ complaint fails to allege that they suffered an out-of-pocket loss 
where plaintiffs were net losers from the fraud or (2) plaintiffs’ expert’s method – not amount – of calculating 
damage cannot survive a Daubert inquiry. 
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B. Earlier Dismissal of Suits Providing Double Recovery 
 
Though exact measures of loss generally come at the end of litigation, the calculation 
method is important at the outset to determine whether plaintiffs’ experienced a net economic 
loss for purposes of pleading a prima facie case of securities fraud.211 It is axiomatic that 
plaintiffs must have an injury (an economic loss) before they can sue.  As noted at the outset of 
this Article, Congress passed the PSLRA, in part, to facilitate earlier dismissal of securities class 
actions that do not plead a prima facie case.  But, without a doctrinal statement limiting 
plaintiffs’ compensation to their out-of-pocket losses, courts are often unable to determine from 
the initial pleadings whether plaintiffs’ suffered compensable losses.   
 
The important consideration in assessing loss is not the monetary amount, which will 
fluctuate based on rulings regarding the class period and in-and-out purchasers, but the method.  
The methodology should account for in-and-out traders and provide a mechanism to net 
plaintiffs’ windfalls against their losses to determine net loss.212 The pivotal question is then: 
assuming that everything in the plaintiffs’ complaint is true and that the expert’s method for 
calculating out-of-pocket loss is sound, did these plaintiffs experience a net loss? 
 
If the answer to that question is “no,” then, when the defendant files a motion to dismiss 
based the plaintiffs’ failure to state a claim, the court should consider dismissal.  Granted, if the 
pleading error is an oversight and the possibility of compensable loss exists, then the court could 
either dismiss the action without prejudice and permit plaintiffs to correct the error or give 
plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint.  But if, according to the stated facts in the complaint, 
plaintiffs could not establish a net loss under the out-of-pocket rule, then the court should dismiss 
the action with prejudice. 
 
Increasing dismissals for cases without out-of-pocket loss accomplishes several goals.213 
First, it helps ensure that the damages roughly approximate the true financial harm of the 
violation.214 Second, if damage awards compensate only out-of-pocket loss, courts may dismiss 
 
211 In Dura, the Supreme Court affirmed that, to plead securities fraud, plaintiffs need to provide only a 
“short and plain statement” to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.  Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 
U.S. 336, 346 (2005).  The complaint must still “provide the defendant with ‘fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim 
is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”  Id. (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 335 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).  “But it should not 
prove burdensome for a plaintiff who has suffered an economic loss to provide a defendant with some indication of 
the loss and the causal connection that the plaintiff has in mind.”  Id. 
212 Because the appropriate model may vary based upon the facts of the case and because experts are 
constantly increasing their knowledge base on this subject, this article does not promote a particular model.  Instead, 
given the loss causation requirement, it observes that any appropriate model must account for in-and-out traders and 
provide a mechanism to net their windfalls against their losses.  For an overview of some of the different types of 
models, see Alessi, supra note 204, at 483; Fischel & Ross, supra note 204, at 138. For additional information on 
conducting a Daubert analysis at the class certification stage, see Chamblee, supra note 210, at 1041. 
213 One of the primary criticisms with earlier dismissal is that it does not permit plaintiffs’ the necessary 
discovery needed to develop their case.  While there are many components to this debate, suffice it to say that 
additional discovery would probably not change whether plaintiffs’ experienced a net loss based on the out-of-
pocket rule.  That information is primarily in the hands of plaintiffs. 
214 The social costs are a different story.  Fraud, even when it ultimately makes investors wealthier, harms 
the market’s integrity.  But there are other mechanisms for deterring fraud besides the class action.  These 
alternatives are increasingly important where investors do not suffer an economic loss. 
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securities class actions that present a potential double-reward for investors who have not 
experienced a true net loss.  Third, compensating investors for only their out-of-pocket losses 
alleviates – but does not eliminate – the problem that securities class actions generally 
redistribute wealth among diversified shareholders.  Finally, limiting recovery in this manner 
gives both parties’ guidance about value when negotiating settlements.  If a corporate defendant 
feels it has a fair chance of dismissal, then it may feel less pressure to settle early in the 
litigation.  Similarly, plaintiffs’ attorneys who are paid on a contingency fee basis are less likely 
to bring certain actions if they know that a court will not compensate plaintiffs with net gains. 
C. Optimizing Deterrence through Increased Predictability  
 
Reimbursing only out-of-pocket loss may also bolster the class action’s ability to deter 
fraud.  Because “unpredictable damages” is one of the factors that undermines optimal 
deterrence,215 a doctrinal statement that plainly confines plaintiffs to an out-of-pocket recovery 
could increase deterrence by increasing predictability.  This restriction also improves deterrence 
by making it easier for judges to determine when to dismiss actions that do not allege 
compensable economic loss, as defined by the out-of-pocket standard.  Admittedly, 
unpredictability also comes from uncertain market reaction to fraud and from variable expert 
calculation methods.  Predicting damages when a corporation is trying to gauge the economic 
harm of issuing a restatement is almost impossible given the impulsive nature of market reaction.  
Still, in formulating a worst-case scenario, the certainty of knowing how a court will calculate 
loss and award damages helps.  Even though setting a fixed method for assessing loss does not 
ameliorate problems with unpredictability, it does offer parties a predictable and reliable starting 
point for calculating potential damage awards.   
 
Moreover, if we assume that corporate actors aim to maximize wealth and that they 
weigh their behaviors to determine which attributes are the most cost-effective, then they can 
adjust their behavior accordingly if the financial costs are known.  This idea may assume too 
much given that plaintiffs often bring securities class actions based on significant market 
fluctuations rather than firm knowledge of corporate wrongdoing.  Of course, social planners 
could also manipulate other variables to increase deterrence.  Although each of these variables 
could merit its own law review article, collectively, they might include defining actionable 
conduct, making a sanction a predictable consequence of wrongful conduct, targeting sanctions 
at wrongdoers rather than at corporations, and providing specific guidelines for when sanctions 
might be imposed.  Suffice it to say that, for our purposes, a doctrinal statement for awarding 
fraud-on-the-market damages will at least provide the start of increased predictability (and thus 
increased deterrence) even though it will not, on its own, produce optimal deterrence.   
 
Because the securities class action functions to deter fraud, one of the primary concerns 
about limiting the class action’s availability to those who experienced a net loss is that corporate 
wrongdoing could go undeterred.  Yet, alternative enforcement means, such as the Department of 
Justice, the exchanges, and the SEC, also deter fraud.  Because most antifraud enforcement 
efforts do not come from private class actions, statistics suggest that limiting the availability of 
 
215 See supra page 27 (discussing Calfee and Craswell’s research that “difficulty measuring damages” is 
one of the factors that thwart optimal deterrence in tort law). 
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private class actions when investors do not experience a net loss does not mean that fraud will go 
undeterred or unpunished.216 
Statistics show that the exchanges, Department of Justice, and the SEC – not private class 
actions – already carry out most enforcement and deterrent efforts.217 From 2000 to 2002, private 
plaintiffs initiated an average of only 205 securities class actions versus 5,101 actions initiated 
by the SEC, Department of Justice, States, National Association of Securities Dealers, and the 
New York Stock Exchange.218 Further, as compared with the average from 2000-2002, the 2005 
statistics indicate that SEC enforcement actions increased and private actions decreased.219 In 
2005, the SEC initiated 630 actions, which is a significant increase compared with the average of 
528 from 2000-2002.220 Moreover, class action filings decreased from 247 in 2004 to 209 in 
2005.221 
All in all, these statistics demonstrate that corporate fraud will not go unpunished or 
undeterred if plaintiffs cannot bring a class action when they do not experience a net monetary 
loss.  Unlike in private securities class actions, the SEC need not prove damage, injury 
(economic loss), or reliance in order to maintain an enforcement action.222 Consequently, the 
SEC’s enforcement and deterrence efforts would not be affected by limiting private class actions 
to net losers who experienced out-of-pocket losses from the fraud.  Thus, enforcement 
mechanisms exist to deter even the situation presented by the gold-platinum hypothetical where 
the share’s higher price was lower than it might otherwise have been absent the fraud.  
Accordingly, social planners should consider limiting the securities class action’s availability to 
investors who experienced out-of-pocket losses.  This could result in at least a small measure of 
increased predictability and could bolster the private securities class action’s deterrence value of 
traditional fraud that causes a stock price decline. 
CONCLUSION 
My intention in this Article is not to imply that simply limiting investors to their out-of-
pocket losses will provide a quick “fix” for the ills of the securities class-action system.  Instead, 
I hoped to highlight some of the intrinsic problems that could result from compensating investors 
with a net gain and from stretching traditional common-law remedies to fit modern securities-
fraud class actions.  Indeed, the out-of-pocket measure is the only common-law remedy that 
recognizes the distinctions between face-to-face transactions and open-market fraud, that 
 
216 See infra Appendix. 
217 See infra Appendix. 
218 Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary Evidence and 
Potential Implications 27 (Aug. 18, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=839250 
(last visited July 5, 2006) (on file with author); infra Appendix.  Yet, these comparatively few class action 
settlements and trials resulted in a total award of $1,923,959,333, whereas the total public enforcement effort (not 
including arbitrations by the NASD or NYSE) resulted in sanctions of $1,864,409,277.  See infra Appendix. 
219 See infra Appendix. 
220 See infra Appendix. 
221 See infra Appendix. 
222 S.E.C. v. Rana Research, Inc., 8 F.3d 1358, 1363 (9th Cir. 1993); S.E.C. v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1490 
(9th Cir. 1993); BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 16, at § 9:1.  The Department of Justice does not have to 
meet the normal standing requirements of private plaintiffs either.  GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 
189, 206 n. 6 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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complies with the loss causation requirement, and that limits plaintiffs to their actual damages.  
Restricting investors to out-of-pocket losses also advances optimal deterrence by increasing 
predictability through a clear doctrinal damage calculation.  Although experts will often differ 
over methodologies,223 identifying the appropriate damage measure at least provides a predictable 
starting point.  Consequently, if the post-Dura courts encounter their own variation of the gold-
platinum hypothetical, I am cautiously optimistic that they might consider the broader 
consequences of compensating investors for more than their out-of-pocket losses and limit 
damage awards accordingly.    
APPENDIX 
Public Enforcement Effort (Annual Averages: 2000-2002)224 2005 
SEC Actions 528 630225 
DOJ Prosecutions 101226 122227 
Exchange Enforcement Effort (Annual Averages: 2000-2002)228 2005 
NASD Actions 1,266 1,399229 
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